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Abstract
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names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
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This paper considers the overall structure of the Danish 
pension system, reviews the relative role of different 
types of pension institutions, and discusses their asset 
allocation strategies and investment performance. The 
paper also examines the regulation and supervision of 
providers of pension services, the growing reliance on 
risk-based supervision, and the application of the so-
called contribution principle. 
   The Danish pension system includes a modest 
universal social pension with a supplement for low-
income pensioners and near universal participation in 
occupational and personal pensions that are primarily 
based on defined contribution plans. The annuity market 
is well developed: 50 percent of annual contributions 
This paper—a product of the Financial Policy Division, Financial Systems Department—is part of a larger effort in the 
department to contribute to the research on the payout phase of defined contribution pension systems. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The program manager of the project may be 
contacted at rrocha@worldbank.org. 
are allocated to the purchase of deferred annuities, while 
immediate annuities are also purchased at or even after 
retirement. However, detailed comprehensive data on the 
rate of annuitization are lacking. 
   Distinct features of the Danish pension system include 
the widespread use of profit participating contracts with 
minimum guaranteed benefits and regular provision of 
bonuses, covering both the accumulation and payout 
phases, and extensive use of group deferred annuity 
contracts. A new traffic light system with periodic stress 
testing has resulted in greater emphasis on asset liability 
matching and hedging strategies by pension institutions 
and a shift in investment policies in favor of foreign 
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This paper on the Danish annuities market is part of a broader project on 
annuities, coordinated by Roberto Rocha, program manager in the unit for Financial 
Markets for the Social Safety Net, of the Financial and Private Sector Development Vice-
Presidency of the World Bank.  The project was initiated in 2004 to contribute to the 
research on the payout phase of defined contribution pension systems.  Many countries 
that have implemented systemic pension reforms and introduced private pension systems 
operating on a defined contribution basis are now facing the challenge of organizing the 
payout phase for retiring workers.  Organizing the payout phase entails introducing a 
well-regulated market for retirement products, which involves the effective regulation 
and supervision of retirement products, marketing activities, and intermediaries.   
However, the literature on the payout phase is generally focused on a few countries and 
topics, and does not address in sufficient detail the institutional and regulatory issues 
faced by policy-makers in reforming countries.  
 
The World Bank project fills this gap by reviewing in detail a number of 
representative country cases, including Australia, Chile, Denmark, Sweden, and 
Switzerland.  These countries have large private pension systems operating primarily on a 
defined contribution basis and have already entered the payout phase.  Moreover, their 
institutional and regulatory arrangements for the payout phase are different in many 
aspects, including decentralized and centralized arrangements for the provision of 
annuities, different menus of retirement products, different approaches to price regulation 
and risk-sharing, different marketing rules, and different capital rules for providers.   
Therefore these countries provide a rich variety of experiences and policy lessons for 
other reforming countries. 
 
Denmark has a large mandatory second pillar that operates on a defined 
contribution base, although with benefit guarantees, and has achieved a high degree of 
annuitization in the payout phase.  The provision of annuities is decentralized, as in 
countries like Chile and Switzerland, with many corporate pension funds and insurance 
companies offering annuities and phased withdrawals.  One of the main characteristics of 
the Danish system is the risk-sharing/profit-sharing arrangement comprising the 
accumulation and payout phases.  The arrangement involves the payments of bonuses 
above the guaranteed benefit, when the conditions allow such payments. This 
arrangement has some attractive features, especially regarding the solvency of providers.  
However, it also requires reasonably complex rules to avoid unfair and unintended 
transfers of income across different stakeholders.              
 
The paper was prepared by Carsten Andersen and Peter Skjødt, of the Danish 
Insurance Association. Jannik Andersen contributed to the writing of Chapter II.  The 
paper benefited from the inputs of Erik Brink Andersen, Roberto Rocha, and Dimitri 
Vittas.  Dimitri Vittas also played a key role in revising and editing parts of the paper.  
The authors alone are responsible for the documentation, analysis and conclusions of the 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Like most OECD countries, the Danish pension system has a multi-pillar structure with a 
high level of complexity. The public pillar comprises both flat and earnings-related 
benefits. At the core of the public pillar, and of the whole system, the social pension 
scheme pays benefits to people over 65. The social pension is unfunded and is financed 
from general tax revenues (i.e. a pay-as-you-go system). It consists of two parts: a flat 
universal pension that is subject to a residency test and proportionality rule as well as an 
employment earnings test and a supplement that is paid to qualifying people subject to an 
income test. 
 
The public pillar also has a smaller component that is fully funded, is financed from 
employer and employee contributions (or the government for unemployed workers and 
those on parental leave, etc.), and operates as a defined contribution plan. This is known 
as ATP (Labor Market Supplementary Pension). Despite being fully funded and based on 
individual accounts, ATP is classified as a first pillar scheme by most Danish pension 
experts because it was established by law and entails social security features. 
 
The second pillar comprises occupational pension plans that are quasi-mandatory and 
nearly universal. Most have been established by collective labor agreements between 
employers and labor unions. They are managed by life insurance companies, multi-
employer pension funds and corporate pension funds as well as banks on a small scale. 
The vast majority of these operate as defined contribution plans. An exception is one of 
the pension schemes for certain civil servants, which is an unfunded tax-financed defined 
benefit plan.  
 
The second pillar also includes three supplementary pension schemes that have been 
created on an ad hoc basis. They are operated as defined contribution plans, are fully 
funded, and two of them are managed by ATP while the last is managed by LD Pensions. 
They are classified as second pillar schemes, because they entail a more direct link 
between the capitalization of plan contributions and benefits. 
 
The third pillar comprises voluntary personal pension plans. These are created by life 
insurance and pension companies as well as banking institutions. The latter are not 
permitted to offer annuity products but can only provide lump sums and phased 
withdrawals. Third pillar plans are to some extent motivated by tax considerations and 
appeal to people who are not covered by occupational pension plans as well as to people 
who wish to supplement their pillar II savings. 
 
Coverage of the three pillars is very high. It is universal or nearly universal in the public 
pillar components, almost 80 percent of wage earners under occupational schemes 
(outside the mandated supplementary schemes), and 40 percent of wage earners in the 
third pillar. Overall, more than 90 percent of wage earners participate in either an 
occupational pension scheme or a third pillar plan. These figures applied for 2003 only. 
This means that people not contributing in 2003, for example because of temporary   - 2 -
unemployment, were not included. Taking more years into account shows a higher 
coverage and provides a more realistic picture of overall coverage. A study concerning 
occupational pension schemes in the period 1995-2000 shows that 93 percent earned the 
right to an occupational pension in at least one year of the period. This figure compares to 
the 80 percent in 2003 only.
2  
 
Another characteristic of the Danish pension system is the extensive use of guaranteed 
minimum benefits in the second and third pillars. Plans operated by insurance companies 
and multi-employer pension funds offer both guaranteed minimum investment returns 
and guaranteed annuity conversion factors in both the second and third pillars. Banks do 
not offer guaranteed minimum investment returns and are not allowed to offer annuities. 
 
The use of guaranteed benefits in occupational pension plans has been promoted by the 
active involvement of labor unions in collective bargaining and a strong emphasis on risk 
sharing arrangements that aim to protect retiring workers from large fluctuations in 
investment returns. The use of guaranteed annuity conversion factors involves the use of 
group annuities that reduce the occurrence of adverse selection in the decision to 
annuitize and lower the cost of annuities. 
 
Like the pension systems of most economically advanced and demographically mature 
countries, the Danish pension system faces a number of important policy challenges. The 
first is the impact of the rapid aging of Danish society on the sustainability of the level of 
promised benefits. The second challenge concerns the financial security of guaranteed 
benefits, an issue that is linked to the efficiency of risk management and the 
appropriateness of the risk sharing arrangements used in Denmark. A third challenge is 
the effectiveness of regulation and supervision and its contribution toward adopting 
adequate risk management practices. 
 
The main objective of this paper is to assess the adequacy and efficiency of risk sharing 
arrangements and risk management practices in the Danish pension and annuity market. 
Chapter II considers the overall structure of the pension system and reviews the relative 
role of different pension institutions. It also discusses the asset allocation and investment 
performance of different institutions and reviews the types of retirement products that are 
offered in Denmark. Chapter III focuses on the regulation and supervision of providers of 
pension services. It places particular emphasis on the growing reliance on risk-based 
supervision and the application of the so-called contribution principle. Chapter IV 
assesses the efficiency of risk sharing arrangements in Denmark. Risk sharing plays a 
significant role in the Danish pension system, but it raises challenging policy issues 
concerning equity and sustainability. The last chapter offers some concluding remarks.  
 
The analysis has been constrained by the difficulty of calculating Money’s Worth Ratios 
(MWRs) for the different types of annuities. Because the Danish system relies 
extensively on the allocation and distribution of bonuses, calculation of MWRs would 
                                                 
2 The study was carried out by The Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs in the report “Increased 
Freedom of Choice in Pension Saving”, May 2003. 
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II.   STRUCTURE OF THE DANISH PENSION SYSTEM 
 
A.   Public Pension Schemes 
 
These cover two schemes that are administered by public sector institutions and aim to 
provide universal or near-universal benefits. As already noted, the main scheme is 
unfunded and financed from general tax revenues, but the main supplementary scheme is 




Denmark was one of the first countries to introduce a public retirement pension system 
more than 100 years ago. It originally targeted the “worthy needy”, but has over time 
expanded to become a universal scheme. The social pension is paid to citizens and non-
citizens, who are over 65 years old, subject to a residency test and proportionality rule.  It 
is also subject to an earnings-from-employment test and is reduced according to specified 
rules. In addition to the flat pension, a supplement is paid to low-income pensioners 
subject to an income test. 
 
Over 700,000 people were recipients of the social pension in 2003 (Table 1). This 
corresponded to 13 percent of the total population or 25 percent of the labor force. The 
average benefit amounted to 30 percent of the average wage or 33 percent of per capita 
income. The total cost of the social pension absorbed 4.4 percent of GDP in 2003, 
corresponding to 7.5 percent of the wage bill. However, these figures include pension 
supplements paid to low-income pensioners. The basic social pension, without any 
supplements, amounted to only 20 percent of the average wage. 
 
Table 1  Social Pension:  Demographic and Economic Data, 1990-2003 
  1990 1995 2000 2003 
 
Pensioners  (000s)  706 709 706 717 
Pensioners/Total  Population  (%)  13.7 13.5 13.2 13.3 
Pensioners/Labor  Force  (%)  24.3 24.7 24.4 25.1 
 
Total  Social  Pensions  (DKK  billion)  35.51 51.20 55.45 61.57 
Total Social Pensions/GDP (%)  4.2  5.0  4.3  4.4 
Total Social Pensions/Wage Bill (%)  7.0  8.5  7.5  7.5 
Total Social Pensions/Public Expend. (%)  7.6  8.4  7.9  8.0 
 
Social  Pension/Average  Wage  (%)  28.7 34.6 30.8 29.8 
Social Pension/Per Capita Income (%)  30.8  37.2  32.5  33.1 
Source: Statistics Denmark 
 
The social pension represents by design a much higher proportion of income for low 
income groups that also have shorter periods of education. Available evidence shows that 
it represents more than 60 percent of the income of unskilled retired workers, about 40 
percent for skilled retired workers, and less than 20 percent for more highly educated 
workers. 
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The projected aging of the Danish population is expected to raise substantially the cost of 
the social pension scheme (Figure 1). According to official projections, the cost will rise 
to 6.5 percent of GDP in 2020 and 7.8 percent in 2037 (Ministry of Social Affairs). If the 
wage bill continues to correspond to close to 60 percent of GDP, this would imply a 
payroll tax of 13 percent if the scheme were to be financed from payroll taxes.   
 
Figure 1  Evolution of Old Age Dependency Ratio 
 
Pensioners relative to age group 20-64 years old. 
Source: Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs 
 
ATP (Labor Market Supplementary Pension Scheme) 
 
Because the level of the social pension was rather modest, the authorities introduced in 
1964 a supplementary pension scheme that initially only applied to employed persons but 
was later expanded to also cover persons on parental leave and recipients of sickness and 
unemployment benefits, etc. Coverage is optional for the self-employed and for recipients 
of disability pensions or early retirement benefits.  
 
The ATP is funded by employer (2/3) and employee (1/3) contributions that are subject to 
relatively low ceilings (maximum of DKK 2,684 per year in 2004), corresponding to less 
than 0.9 percent of the average wage
3. Contributions to ATP are not related to income, 
but are set as fixed amounts. These depend on a few broad categories that have been 
defined on the basis of the number of working hours. For people on transfer payment, 
contributions are split between the transfer recipient and tax payers (1/3 and 2/3 
respectively). 
 
Benefits are also subject to a low ceiling (the maximum annual pension for new 
pensioners with a full contribution record between 1964 and 2004 was DKK 22,428 in 
2004). This was equivalent to 40 percent of the basic social pension and less than 8 
percent of the average wage. Benefits used to be based only on the total size of 
                                                 
3 The contribution amounts are adjusted from time to time. The maximum contribution was raised to DKK 
2,924 in 2006.   
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contributions, irrespective of when they were made, but now investment returns are also 
taken into account.  
 
Table 2  ATP Coverage, Contributions and Benefits 
  1993 1995 2000 2004 
 
ATP  members  (000s)  3,450 3,550 4,271 4,355 
ATP  pensioners  409 423 467 535 
All  pensioners  710 709 706 746 
ATP/All  pensioners  (%)  58% 60% 66% 72% 
 
Contributions  (DKK  billion)  4.05 4.64 6.30 6.68 
Total contributions/GDP (%)    0.46%  0.49%  0.45% 
Total contributions/Wage bill (%)    0.78%  0.86%  0.78% 
 
Benefits (DKK billion)    2.60  3.23  4.84 
ATP  benefits/GDP  (%)    0.26% 0.25% 0.33% 
Source: ATP and Statistics Denmark 
 
Benefits take the form of annuities, calculated at an interest rate of 2 percent, but with the 
possibility of bonus payments from accumulated investment reserves. Bonus payments 
aim to maintain the real value of pensions. Lump sums are allowed when the amount of 
accumulated capital is small. Bonus payments reflecting the investment performance of 
ATP are made to both cash pensions and accumulated balances. 
 
Coverage of ATP increased rapidly over the years (Table 2). The total number of member 
accounts exceeds the total labor force, a feature that is found in most other countries that 
do not suffer from evasion and under-reporting and reflects the temporary exit of 
economically active people from the labor force.  The number of ATP pensioners has 
increased steadily relative to the number of recipients of the social pension. It reached 72 
percent of all pensioners in 2004. It is projected to reach 98 percent when the extension 
of ATP membership to universal participation will reach maturity. 
 
The limited role played by ATP is highlighted by the size of contributions and benefits 
relative to GDP. These respectively amounted to 0.45 and 0.33 percent of GDP in 2004. 
Total contributions are less than 0.8 percent of the wage bill.  
 
B.   Occupational Pensions 
 
Because both the social pension scheme and ATP pay modest benefits, most workers are 
also covered by private occupational pension schemes that have been promoted by 
collective bargaining. Participation is not mandated by law, but is effectively imposed by 
collective labor agreements. Three statutory supplementary pension schemes, in addition 
to ATP, have also been created on ad hoc basis. Two of these also have universal 
coverage, while participation in the third is voluntary and narrow. 
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Non-Statutory Occupational Pension Plans 
 
Occupational pension plans were first introduced in the 19
th century. The first plan 
covered civil servants, but over time other privileged sectors, such as banking, insurance 
and utilities, also created pension plans for their employees. Coverage expanded 
gradually during the 20
th century, but received a major boost in the late 1980s and early 
1990s as a result of collective bargaining and political support through the offer of tax 
incentives. Political support was also offered through the establishment of the statutory 
supplementary pension schemes, such as ATP and a couple of additional savings-based 
statutory schemes (see below). 
 
Denmark, like most OECD countries and unlike Australia and Switzerland, has not 
enacted a mandatory occupational pension pillar, but coverage is extensive and reaches 
almost 80 percent of the wage earners. Participation is compulsory without discrimination 
in those industries and companies where a pension plan has been created. 
 
The vast majority of occupational pension plans are defined contribution plans, and they 
also offer death and disability benefits. Most schemes offer guaranteed investment returns 
and also involve the use of group annuities. Following legislation, unisex criteria are 
applied for the calculation of benefits under group annuities, even though women have a 
longer life expectancy than men. In addition, participation in standard occupational 
pension schemes, including life and disability insurance, and group annuities is not 
subject to health screening. 
 
Because occupational pension plans have been established by collective bargaining rather 
than through a government mandated program, there is a wide variation of terms and 
conditions that reflect among other things industry or sector-specific factors. This variety 
adds to the complexity of the Danish pension system and makes its analysis very 
dependent on the availability of detailed data. However, the high fragmentation of the 
system among a large number of pension plans has impeded the compilation of detailed 
information on the design and structure of different pension plans as well as on their 
performance. 
 
Three main types of institutions participate in the second pillar. Corporate pension funds, 
which cover the employees of single companies, play a marginal and declining part. 
Many of them are actually run-off schemes, having been closed to new members and 
even to new contributions. Thus, pension funds as known in several other OECD 
countries - i.e., closely linked to a sponsoring company - play a marginal role in the 
Danish market. Multi-employer pension funds are created as member-owned pension 
funds and cover industry-wide plans, such as for example nurses. Life insurance 
companies are the most important group of institutions. They are established as 
shareholder-owned joint-stock companies: some on a commercial basis (with 
shareholders demanding a return) and some on a non-commercial basis.  
 
Life insurance companies typically manage employer-specific plans, which are 
negotiated with the employers concerned and cover all people employed by them. 
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Although they have different ownership structures, life insurance companies and pension 
funds are subject to identical accounting, reporting and other regulatory rules and there is 
fierce competition between pension and insurance companies. Banking institutions play a 
small part in the second pillar. 
 
Life insurance and multi-employer pension funds have the lion's share of the market for 
occupational pensions. Corporate pension funds have a small share of the market, while 
banks receive about 10 percent of total contributions. 
 
Contributions to occupational pension plans increased steadily over the past ten years or 
so. Their annual growth rate was remarkably stable, ranging between 10 and 12 percent 
in nominal terms, while during the same period (1995-2004) inflation averaged 2 percent 
per year. The strong performance of contributions is reflected in their growing level 
relative to GDP, which nearly doubled from 2.36 percent in 1995 to 4.31 percent in 2004 
(Table 3). 
 
Table 3  Contributions to Occupational Pension Plans, 1995-2004 
  1995 2000 2004 
     
Contributions  (DKK  billion)  23.80 41.52 62.92 
Contributions/GDP  (%)  2.36% 3.21% 4.29% 
     
Contributions to Annuities (% of total)  59.8%  57.2%  50.1% 
Contributions to Phased Withdrawals (%)  9.9%  23.1%  35.1% 
Contributions to Lump Sums (%)  30.3%  19.7%  14.7% 
     
Contributions to L&P companies (%)  85.8%  89.6%  89.0% 
Contributions to Banks (%)  14.2%  10.4%  11.0% 
     
Contributions to Unit-Linked     5.2%  8.7%* 
* 2003 
Source: Statistics Denmark, Central Customs and Tax Administration and the Danish 
Insurance Association. 
 
The increase in contribution amounts is partly due to expanding coverage and partly to a 
gradually rising contribution rate. While contribution rates (like many other features of 
pension plans) vary considerably among different schemes, the upward trend in 
contribution rates is illustrated by the following figure, which represents the evolution of 
the average contribution rate for schemes covered by the labor agreement between the 
Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and the Danish Employers’ Confederation 
(DA). This agreement covers half the labor force. The contribution rate has crept upwards 
from 1 percent in 1993 to over 10 percent in 2006 (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2  Evolution of Contribution Rate 
 
Source: The Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs. 
 
Expanding coverage is confirmed by the age pattern of contributors. The highest 
participation rate is shown by people aged between 35 and 50 at close to 80 percent, 
while those over 50 and especially those over 60 show much lower participation rates. 
This is not surprising, because many people above 60 take out tax subsidized early 
retirement. Younger people, especially those below 25, also report low participation rates 
- again, not surprising, because many have not yet entered the labor market (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 Participation in Occupational Pension Plans by Age Group, 2003 
 
Source: The Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs. 
 
Occupational pension plans offer a variety of retirement products, ranging from life 
annuities to term annuities, phased withdrawals and lump sum payments. Most plans 
offer this choice of products. Plans differ in the degree of flexibility and choice they 
allow to their members. In some cases, the premiums for term life and disability 
insurance are allowed to vary with commensurate changes in the size of the related 
benefits, but otherwise all contributions are directed to group annuities. In other plans, 
members have broader choice between the different retirement products. Members are 
free to choose additional life or term annuities at any time, but once an annuity has been 
chosen the contract is not reversible.  
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In the case of occupational pension plans, 50 percent of contributions were allocated to 
annuities in 2004 (Table 3). The sub-allocation between life and term annuities is not 
known. However, the 2004 pattern represented a relative decline in the importance of 
annuities, which absorbed 60 percent of contributions in 1995. Allocations for phased 
withdrawals, which run for between 10 and 25 years (i.e. they are not lifelong products), 
absorbed an increasing proportion of total contributions. They rose from 10 percent in 
1995 to 35 percent of total contributions in 2004. In contrast, contributions allocated to 
lump sum payments fell from 30 to 15 percent of the total. To a large extent this reflected 
changes in tax provisions, which sought to discourage the use of lump sums on 
retirement. It must be underlined that lump sum and phased withdrawal schemes can be 
converted into annuities at any time. Hence, data based on the allocation of contributions 
understate the actual share of annuities.  
 
A relatively recent feature of the Danish pension industry is the offer of unit-linked 
products. This has been prompted by the reduction in guaranteed investment returns and a 
growing preference of plan members to invest in high return/high risk assets. However, 
the proportion of annual contributions that is allocated to unit-linked products is still 
small, at less than 9 percent of the total. 
 
A distinguishing feature of Danish pension plans is the offer of minimum guaranteed 
investment returns for both the accumulation and payout phases.  The minimum 
guarantees are effectively embedded options that members and policy holders have the 
right to exercise if market rates fall below the guaranteed rates. Pension institutions create 
appropriate reserves to cover the guaranteed benefits and then distribute bonuses to 
members depending on the performance of their funds. The distribution of bonuses is 
based on the so-called contribution principle to avoid unjustified and distorting transfers 
across different groups of members.  
 
The maximum guaranteed technical rate was initially set at 4.5 percent per year, was 
reduced to 2.5 percent in 1994, and further to 1.5 percent in 1999. The new rates apply to 
new contracts. New contributions made to old contracts are subject to their original 
guaranteed rates. However, such contributions are not unlimited but are subject to rules 
specified in the relevant plans or contracts. The setting of minimum guaranteed returns 
has reflected the evolution of market rates, especially the yields on ten-year government 
bonds (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4 Guaranteed Interest Rates and After-Tax Yield-to-Maturity on a 10-year 




Source: Danmarks Nationalbank 
10-year government bond after pension investment returns tax/real interest tax 
4.5 per cent guarantee 
2.5 per cent guarantee 
1.5 per cent guarantee 
 
 
Statutory Supplementary Schemes 
 
As already noted, three statutory supplementary schemes have been created over time to 
supplement the benefits obtained from the social pension and ATP. The most important is 
the SP (Special Pension Savings Scheme) that was introduced in 1998 to dampen 
economic activity and increase savings. However, contributions to the SP were 
suspended for 2004 and 2005. The suspension was later extended to 2007, creating 
considerable uncertainty about its future. 
 
Table 4 SP Coverage, Contributions and Benefits 
  1995 2000 2004 
SP active members (000s)    3,128  3,391 
SP pensioners      38 
All  pensioners  709 706 746 
SP/All pensioners (%)      5% 
Contributions (DKK billion)    6.88  0 
Total contributions/GDP (%)    0.51%   
Total contributions/Wage bill (%)    0.94%   
Benefits (DKK billion)      .30 
SP benefits/GDP (%)      0.02% 
Source: ATP and Statistics Denmark 
   
SP is administered by ATP. It is a defined contribution plan that is funded from a 1 
percent contribution rate, paid by all wage earners, self-employed persons, and some 
recipients of transfer payments, aged between 16-64 years old. In 2004, coverage of the 
SP amounted to 3.4 million persons or 84% of the population aged between 16-64 years 
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old (Table 4). Benefits depend on the size of contributions and investment returns. 
Benefits take the form of ten-year annuities with payouts starting on retirement. But like 
ATP, smaller accumulated amounts are paid out as lump-sums. The total assets of SP 
corresponded to 2.5 percent of GDP in 2004. 
 
The second supplementary scheme in terms of importance is the LD scheme that was 
introduced in 1977. This aimed at changing the then prevailing highly inflationary 
practice of automatically adjusting wages and salaries to “cost-of-living” increases. The 
LD scheme froze these “cost of living adjustments” into a special pension scheme. This 
involved the creation of individual accounts, investing the saved amounts, and paying out 
the accumulated capital of individual accounts as lump sums on retirement. 
 
The LD scheme has not received any contributions or new members since 1980. About 
half its members have retired by now but there are still around 1.3 million workers with 
LD accounts. The scheme is managed by LD Pensions, a public sector institution that is 
similar to ATP. The total assets of LD amounted to DKK 58 billion in 2004, 
corresponding to four percent of GDP.  
 
The third supplementary scheme is a narrow, voluntary scheme, known as SUPP. It was 
introduced in 2003 for people who had taken early retirement prior to that year and 
wanted to increase their future pension income by saving through tax-favored accounts
4. 
This scheme covers about 250,000 people, representing 7 percent of the population aged 
between 18 and 65.  
 
The pension provider can be freely chosen among ATP and private pension institutions 
(although not all of the latter participate in SUPP). One-third of the contributions are 
made by the pensioners themselves and two-thirds by the government. The benefits are 
similar to those of ATP - either a life annuity or a lump sum, depending on the size of the 
account balance. The rate of contribution is subject to a maximum of about 3% of the 
early retirement benefit. 
 
C.   Personal Pensions 
 
Personal pension plans constitute the third pillar of the Danish pension system. They are 
offered by banking, insurance and pension institutions and are established on a voluntary 
basis by persons who are not covered by occupational pension schemes or wish to obtain 
additional coverage. As in most countries, they benefit from tax advantages that emulate 
the fiscal benefits conferred on occupational pension schemes. 
 
Contributions to personal pension plans grew at a more modest rate over the past decade. 
In 1999, they suffered a large decline but otherwise they kept pace with the growth in 
national income. They amounted in 2004 to 1.36 percent of GDP (Table 5), at about one-
third the level of contributions to occupational pension schemes. Total contributions to 
                                                 
4 Workers and employees receiving early retirement benefits after 2003 are mandated to contribute to ATP. 
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the second and third pillars were close to 6 percent of GDP or about 10 percent of 
earnings. 
 
Table 5 Contributions to Personal Pension Plans, 1995-2004 
  1995 2000 2004 
     
Contributions (DKK billion)  15.584 16.209 19.933 
Contributions/GDP  (%)  1.54% 1.25% 1.36% 
     
Contributions to Annuities (% of total)  11.8%  15.2%  15.1% 
Contributions to Phased Withdrawals (%)  20.2%  37.6%  49.3% 
Contributions to Lump Sums (%)  68.1%  47.3%  35.6% 
     
Contributions to L&P companies (%)  40.8%  44.2%  41.7% 
Contributions to Banks (%)  59.2%  55.8%  58.3% 
     
Contributions to Unit-Linked     3.2%  6.5%* 
* 2003 
Source: Statistics Denmark, Central Customs and Tax Administration and the Danish Insurance 
Association. 
 
Contributions to annuities (life or term) have absorbed a small part of personal pension 
contributions at close to 15 percent. As in the case of second pillar contributions, there 
has been a major shift away from lump sum payments and in favor of phased 
withdrawals. This reflected changes in the tax treatment of lump sum payments. Banking 
institutions play a bigger part in personal pension plans than in second pillar plans, 
accounting for nearly 60 percent of total contributions. The relatively greater success of 
banks in personal pension plans may be explained by their stronger presence in the retail 
financial services market and the preference of some people for savings rather than 
insurance. 
 
Members of personal pension plans are subject to health screening if they purchase any 
insurance products, while annuity prices are not based on unisex rates as is the case with 
occupational schemes. However, personal pension plans often benefit from guaranteed 
minimum investment returns that are similar to those offered in occupational schemes. 
The recent reduction in guaranteed returns has stimulated a growing interest in unit-
linked products, and greater demand for individual choice. Contributions to unit-linked 
products reached 6.5 percent of the total in 2003. Unit-linked products benefit some times 
from a guarantee against negative returns by giving up some of the upside potential. 
 
D.   Asset Accumulation and Investment Performance 
 
With expanding coverage, rising contribution rates (as suggested by the collective labor 
agreement between LO and DA) and positive real investment returns, the total assets of 
the pension system increased from DKK 847 billion in 1995 (corresponding to 83 percent 
of GDP) to 1,822 billion in 2004 (125% of GDP). This is comparable to the level found 
in Switzerland, the Netherlands and the UK and suggests the existence of a strong capital 
base for financing the pensions of retiring workers over the coming decades.  
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The relative shares of different pension institutions have been remarkably stable. LD, 
corporate pension funds and banks suffered some decline in their market shares, while 
ATP, life insurance companies and multi-employer pension funds experienced increases. 
 
Table 6  Pension Assets 
  1995 2000 2004 
     
Total Pension Assets (DKK billion)  847.2  1507.2  1822.1 
Total Pension Assets/GDP (%)  83.1%  116.5%  124.8% 
     
ATP (% of total)  15.2%  16.4%  16.9% 
SP (% of total)    1.4%  2.5% 
LD (% of total)  4.3%  4.1%  3.2% 
Life Insurance Companies (% of  total)  41.8% 43.1% 44.5% 
Multi-Employer Pension Funds (% of 
total) 
17.2% 17.9% 18.6% 
Corporate Pension Funds (% of total)  4.0%  2.9%  2.2% 
Banks (% of total)  17.5%  14.3%  12.2% 
Source: Statistics Denmark and the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority 
 
Pension institutions used to invest heavily in Danish bonds, especially Danish mortgage 
bonds that enjoyed a higher yield over government securities while being considered as 
highly safe. However, during the course of the 1990s, a shift toward Danish and foreign 
equities had taken place. As an example, in 1998, ATP invested 55 percent of its assets in 
Danish bonds, 26 percent in Danish equities and 10 percent in foreign equities (Table 7). 
Life insurance companies had more conservative portfolios because of the guaranteed 
elements of the products they offer, with Danish and foreign equities absorbing 25 
percent of total assets in 1998. Pension funds had asset allocations that fell in between 
those of ATP and insurance companies. 
 
However, the global decline in equity prices and a stronger emphasis on risk-based 
supervision induced a reconsideration of these investment policies. By 2004, ATP direct 
investments in equities, both domestic and foreign, fell to 18 percent of total assets and 
those of life insurance companies to 12 percent. For life insurance companies and pension 
funds, direct equity investments decreased to 15 percent of total assets. They increased 
their use of investment funds, which invest in diversified portfolios and may also 
incorporate various risk hedging elements.  All types of institutions increased 
substantially their investments in foreign bonds, seeking higher yields and benefiting 
from the stability of the exchange rate between the Danish crown and the euro. They also 
increased their use of derivatives, especially long-term swap contracts in the euro market, 
to hedge their long-term liabilities.  
 
The investment performance of different types of pension institutions was broadly 
similar. In a competitive market, where each company decides its own investment policy, 
some will perform above and some below market average, but for practical purposes the 
performance of the different groups of institutions should be considered as very similar.  
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Table 7  Asset Composition 
 ATP 
 1995  1998  2004 
      
Danish Bonds    55.0%  26.1% 
Foreign Bonds    2.4%  32.2% 
Danish Equities    25.2%  9.6% 
Foreign Equities    10.7%  7.9% 
Investment Funds    1.2%  3.1% 
Real Estate    2.0%  1.8% 
Derivatives     10.2% 
Other   3.5%  9.1% 
      
      
      
  Life Insurance Companies 
 1995  1998  2004 
      
Danish Bonds  65.6%  55.2%  49.6% 
Foreign Bonds  0.5%  1.6%  15.5% 
Danish Equities  7.7%  12.2%  4.1% 
Foreign Equities  4.7%  12.0%  7.7% 
Investment Funds  0.4%  0.8%  6.4% 
Real Estate  1.4%  1.2%  1.2% 
Derivatives ..  ..  .. 
Other 19.7%  17.0%  15.5% 
      
      




  1995 1998 2004 
      
Danish Bonds  59.2%  52.6%  27.9% 
Foreign Bonds  0.6%  0.7%  12.3% 
Danish Equities  14.3%  16.2%  5.8% 
Foreign Equities  6.3%  13.0%  9.7% 
Investment Funds  2.8%  4.4%  26.3% 
Real Estate  6.3%  4.6%  5.4% 
Derivatives ..  ..  .. 
Other 11.5%  8.5%  12.6% 
Note: Data on the use of derivatives is incomplete. Many life insurance companies and 
pension funds have hedged the interest rate risk on their liabilities through the use of 
derivatives. 
Source: The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority and ATP 
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Average investment returns on total assets over the decade 1995-2004 amounted to 7.4 
percent (Table 8). With inflation averaging 2 percent over the past decade, investment 
returns were substantially positive in real terms.  All types of institutions achieved higher 
returns in the first half of the period. Returns in the second half were affected by the 
global collapse of equity prices and the large fall in interest rates.   
 
Pension institutions in Denmark suffer when interest rates fall because the vast majority 
of mortgage bonds that represent a substantial part of their assets are callable and 
borrowers refinance their mortgages when rates are falling. Falling interest rates and the 
embedded call option of mortgage bonds also affect the financial solvency of pension 
institutions because the increase in the value of their long-term liabilities is not matched 
by a corresponding increase in the market value of their holdings of long-term bonds.  
 
Table 8  Investment Returns 
  1995-99 2000-04  1995-2004 
ATP  9.9% 5.5% 7.7% 
SP   2.9%   
LD  11.0% 6.0% 8.5% 
Total  Public  10.1% 5.4% 7.8% 
     
Life  Insurance  Companies  10.4% 4.5% 7.4% 
Multi-Employer  Pension  Funds  9.8% 4.1% 6.9% 
Corporate  Pension  Funds  11.5% 2.8% 7.0% 
Total  Private  10.3% 4.3% 7.2% 
     
Grand  Total  10.2% 4.6% 7.4% 
Source: The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority, LD Pensions and ATP 
 
The operating expenses of pension institutions, at least for those institutions for which 
detailed data are available, are comparable to those of similar institutions in other 
continental European countries and significantly lower than those prevailing in Latin 
American private pillars. The operating costs of the pension accounts held with banks are 
not published but they are probably close to those of retail mutual funds and thus 
somewhat higher than those of life insurance companies and pension funds.  
 
Benefiting from economies of scale because of its large size and also from its compulsory 
nature, ATP reports very low operating costs, again replicating the experience of similar 
institutions in other countries.  
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Table 9  Administrative Expense Ratios (Percent of Average Assets) 
  1995-99 2000-04  1995-2004 
     
ATP  0.045% 0.046% 0.046% 
SP   0.268%   
LD  0.058% 0.067% 0.083% 
Total  Public  0.048% 0.069% 0.059% 
     
Life  Insurance  Companies  0.576% 0.557% 0.567% 
Multi-Employer  Pension  Funds  0.194% 0.157% 0.176% 
Corporate  Pension  Funds  0.087% 0.085% 0.086% 
Total  Private  0.442% 0.425% 0.434% 
     
Grand  Total  0.348% 0.336% 0.342% 




Table 10  Investment Expense Ratios (Percent of Average Assets) 
  1995-99 2000-04  1995-2004 
     
ATP  0.011% 0.023% 0.017% 
SP   0.119%   
LD  0.073% 0.090% 0.081% 
Total  Public  0.023% 0.040% 0.032% 
     
Life  Insurance  Companies  0.055% 0.098% 0.077% 
Multi-Employer  Pension  Funds  0.153% 0.142% 0.148% 
Corporate  Pension  Funds  0.145% 0.156% 0.150% 
Total  Private  0.087% 0.113% 0.100% 
     
Grand  Total  0.072% 0.095% 0.083% 
Source: The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority, LD Pensions and ATP 
 
 
Table 11  Total Operating Expense Ratios (Percent of Average Assets) 
  1995-99 2000-04  1995-2004 
     
ATP  0.056 0.069 0.062 
SP   0.387   
LD  0.131 0.156 0.144 
Total  Public  0.072 0.109 0.090 
     
Life  Insurance  Companies  0.631 0.656 0.643 
Multi-Employer  Pension  Funds  0.347 0.300 0.323 
Corporate  Pension  Funds  0.232 0.241 0.236 
Total  Private  0.529 0.538 0.534 
     
Grand Total  0.420  0.431  0.425% 
Source: The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority, LD Pensions and ATP 
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In general, public sector institutions have lower expense ratios than private sector ones 
(Tables 9 to 11). Administrative expense ratios are higher for life insurance companies 
and somewhat surprising for the SP fund. The main reasons for this are the nature of the 
public schemes as compulsory schemes and standardized products without possibility to 
adjust to individual demands.  
 
Administrative expense ratios were stable or even declined over time. In contrast, 
investment expense ratios rose for all types of institutions, probably reflecting the greater 
intensity of investment policies and the more active search for improved returns.  
 
Despite the grave concerns that have been expressed in recent years about the solvency 
and investment performance of pension institutions, in the light of their long-standing 
guarantees, the overall performance of most types of pension institutions has been quite 
satisfactory. Investment returns have been substantially positive in real terms and have 
exceeded the guaranteed returns, while operating costs averaging 43 basis points for all 
pension institutions are low by international standards. However, the declining trend in 
returns and the negative results of 2001 and 2002 justify both the lowering of guarantees 
and the growing emphasis on risk-based regulation and supervision.   
 
E.   Market Concentration 
 
Like the retail financial markets of most countries around the world, concentration in the 
market for pensions and annuities is on the high side. However, because of new entry in 
the market and the growth of some of those pension institutions that were established as 
part of labor market agreements, the share of the top five companies fell from 70 percent 
of total premiums in 1995 to 55 percent in 2004 (Figure 5). The Herfindahl Index of 
concentration also fell from 1267 to 854 over the same period.  A Herfindahl Index of 
854 is considered low and implies a contestable market. In fact, individual companies 
experienced significant changes in their market shares as well as rankings.   
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Figure 5  Market Concentration 
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1995 2000 2004  
Source: The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority 
 
F.   Retirement Products 
 
Retirement products include various types of annuities, phased withdrawals and lump 
sum payments. A distinguishing feature of the Danish pension system is the use of 
deferred group annuities, whereby workers commit to a life annuity at the time of making 
their contributions at a preset minimum conversion factor that reflects the guaranteed 
minimum interest rate and the life tables. Annuity payments are augmented by bonus 
payments if the actual investment performance exceeds the guaranteed return or if the 
mortality experience is higher than expected.  
 
This type of policy avoids the problems of adverse selection and provides guaranteed 
minimum benefits, but also allows participation in any future superior performance. 
However, its success depends on the equitable distribution of bonuses and requires strong 
confidence in the integrity of the management of pension institutions. 
 
The benefits paid by the system also include survivor benefits to the heirs of contributing 
workers in cases of early death as well as disability pensions in cases of incapacitation. 
These types of benefits are based on calculations of actuarial probabilities based on past 
experience as well as future projections and expectations. The system also provides 
annuities with a minimum number of guaranteed payments as well as immediate life 
annuities, which are purchased at the time of retirement (or even later). 
 
Group contracts are generally specified in collective labor agreements. These aim to 
provide for minimum annuity benefits to complement the pension benefits from the 
public schemes and also include survivor and disability benefits. Participating employees 
and their dependents are not subject to individual health screening but costs and benefits 
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depend on group experience. Based on legislation, group annuities, like occupational 
pension schemes, are calculated on the basis of unisex rates. In contrast, individual 
contracts are not based on unisex rates and are subject to health screening. 
 
Collective labor agreements vary in their specific terms and especially in the extent to 
which they allow for non-group benefits, such as phased withdrawals, lump sums, and 
unit-linked policies. Phased withdrawals are extensively used. For premiums to be 
deductible from taxable income, payments must be spread over at least 10 years but may 
run for up to 25 years. However, benefits cannot be paid after reaching the age of 85. 
Lump sum payments are also possible if provided under the pension contract or collective 
labor agreement that governs pension benefits. Their use has declined in recent years, but 
they are still the preferred form of benefit when accumulated balances are low. 
 
Tax considerations also affect the choice of retirement product. In general, contributions 
are deductible from taxable income while benefits are subject to tax. The only exception 
is the special labor market tax of 8 percent which is levied on contributions but not on 
benefits
5. Like some other countries with advanced occupational pension systems, such 
as Sweden, the Netherlands and South Africa, the investment income of pension 
institutions is subject to income tax at a flat rate of 15 percent. Other than the ceiling that 
is imposed on annual contributions to lump sum contracts, there are only few other 
ceilings on pension saving, but the application of a 15 percent tax on investment income 
acts as a disincentive to excessive saving through pension contracts for pure tax 
avoidance purposes. 
 
Lump sum payments used to be favored by the tax system because they were subject to a 
flat rate of tax of 40 percent that was lower than the marginal income tax rates applied to 
annuity payments and phased withdrawals applying to high income earners.
6 Probably 
lump sums were also favored simply because many pensioners preferred to be able to 
decide upon the use of their savings early upon retirement. Reductions in the level of the 
value of the tax deductibility of premiums paid to lump sum schemes - for people paying 
the highest marginal rate of income taxation - have reduced the tax attractiveness of lump 
sum payments and this explains the declining share of new premiums that are allocated to 
lump sum contracts. However, generally speaking, the progressive nature of the Danish 
income tax system continues to confer benefits to tax deferral through pension saving. 
 
Tax considerations explain the availability of data for the allocation of contributions to 
different contracts since tax deductibility depends on the identification of premiums by 
category of payout profile. However, no data is available on the distribution of payouts 
among the different types of benefits. This is probably due to the young age of the 
                                                 
5 The special labor market tax is not imposed on investment and transfer income. It is a regular tax that is 
not earmarked for any particular purpose. 
 
6Before the tax rules were changed, contributions to lump sum schemes were deductible at the marginal 
rate of up to 58 percent, but lump sum benefits were taxed at a maximum rate of 40 percent. After the 
change in the rules in 1999, the maximum tax deduction of contributions to lump sum schemes was limited 
to 43 percent (i.e., it no longer applied to the top tax bracket of 15 percent). 
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universality of the pension system. Although occupational pension schemes have been in 
existence for a very long time, their expansion to near universal coverage is a relatively 
recent phenomenon. The new coverage has not reached maturity yet and there is little 
data on the conversion of phased withdrawals and lump sum payments into life annuities.   
 
G.   Risk-Sharing Characteristics 
 
One of the most interesting features of the Danish pension system is the extensive use of 
risk-sharing arrangements. These take several distinct but complementary forms. First, 
there is the social pension scheme, which provides minimum benefits with considerable 
additional payments for low-income pensioners. This is financed on a pay-as-you-go 
basis from general tax revenues. Second, extensive use is made of group contracts, 
including group annuities, under the quasi-mandatory occupational pension plans that are 
covered by collective labor agreements. Third, minimum guaranteed returns are offered 
for the accumulation and payout phases by both the second and third pillars. Fourth, the 
system is based on the management and distribution of bonuses on the basis of the so-
called contribution principle that tries to avoid transfers across groups of customers. Both 
shareholder-owned joint-stock companies and member-owned mutual institutions 
compete for pension business and are subject to identical rules regarding the buildup of 
reserves and declaration of bonuses.  
 
The size of the benefits allocated to members depends on the size of individual 
contributions, the investment income from accumulated assets, the operating costs of the 
plans, and the net results of insurance risks, arising from the offer of life, disability and 
longevity insurance. When employees join a plan, all future premiums, including those 
emanating from future pay rises as part of labor market agreements, are taken into 
account in calculating the level of guaranteed benefits. Even in the payout period, 
benefits which are not provided as lump sums are covered by the guarantee. The 
guaranteed benefits are computed by making projections that may extend for 60 years or 
longer, considering both the accumulation and payout phases.  The risks to the pension 
institutions that provide the guarantees are potentially very large and necessitate the use 
of highly conservative assumptions. 
 
The guaranteed benefits are calculated according to actuarial techniques, taking into 
account a number of assumptions concerning the future interest rate, the insurance risks, 
the expected costs, etc. The assumptions are made on a conservative basis. Under normal 
circumstances the realized results will show a surplus, most of which must be given 
during the life time of the pension contract to the insured in the form of regular bonuses.  
 
The bonus policy is decided by the pension institutions. Life insurance and pension 
companies compete to offer the best bonuses to their customers. However, the freedom to 
establish the individual institution's own bonus policy is subject to severe restrictions. 
The so-called contribution principle sets clear limits on the use and release of realized 
surplus. The offer of minimum guaranteed benefits does not imply the transformation of 
the Danish pension system into a defined-benefit system. This is because the use of 
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highly conservative assumptions allows the declaration of large bonuses under normal 
circumstances. 
 
Bonuses are often distributed to policyholders by increasing the guaranteed benefits. 
However, the guarantees on the bonuses themselves are given at the guaranteed rate 
prevailing at the time of bonus declaration and not at the rate that was guaranteed at the 
inception of the contract. Thus for most pension plans, the interest rate and insurance 
risks are shared between the pension institution concerned and the members. The risk that 
the realized investment return will be lower than the guaranteed rate is borne by the 
pension institution, while the risk of low investment returns but above the guaranteed 
floor is shared with the insured. In the same way, insurance risks, including longevity 
risk, are shared between the pension institution and the insured. The insured are 
guaranteed a minimum level of life long pension benefits, but a prolongation of the mean 
lifetime will result in lower pension benefits as long as they are above the guaranteed 
minimum level. 
 
The guarantees are based on the total of the technical insurance elements: interest rate, 
insurance risks, and costs. Hence, a surplus in one of the technical elements reduces the 
risk of the company in the other elements. The technical rates, including assumptions on 
insurance risks, such as mortality and disability tables, must be notified to the supervisory 
authority before they can be used. The supervisor has the power to set aside the notified 
tables and demand a more cautious practice by a particular pension institution. But the 
supervisor does not provide any guidelines or benchmarks concerning mortality or 
disability tables. These matters are left to be decided by individual pension institutions on 
the basis of their particular experience but subject to notification to the supervisor. 
Traditionally the Danish pension institutions use population tables that do not incorporate 
projections of longevity improvements. They use different techniques to correct for such 
improvements, and many of them consider introducing cohort tables.     
 
The continuing prevalence of pension contracts with the relatively high minimum 
guaranteed return of 4.5% has forced pension institutions to invest in a cautious way to 
lower their investment risks. However, this kind of investment policy is likely to result in 
lower returns over the longer run. This implies that choosing a guarantee for the pension 
benefits could produce lower pension benefits. Realization of this possibility has led to a 
growing demand for products without guarantees or with a lower level of guarantees. In 
the Danish market a large variety of such products has been developed during the last 
years - in both pillar II and pillar III schemes. Market supply is now much more diverse 
and allows customers to select the products that suit their personal characteristics. 
 
In some pension schemes conditional guarantees have been introduced, i.e., guarantees 
under which it is possible in certain extraordinary circumstances to reduce the interest 
rate and thus reduce the guaranteed benefits. Such circumstances are defined in the 
contracts and depend on external events, such as changes in the market interest rate.  The 
aim of such contracts is to provide the individual member of a pension scheme the 
maximum security of fixed minimum benefits under ordinary market conditions and at 
the same time allow the pension scheme to optimize its investment policy. 
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Other products have been introduced without any guarantee or with a low guarantee, 
normally a zero rate guarantee, which most often is a guarantee that workers will at least 
not lose the principal amount of their investments during the whole saving period, 
although they may still suffer losses from inflation. Another type of zero rate guarantees 
is a so called "water-level" guarantee, where interest once earned can never be lost again. 
These products typically offer customers a choice between a few investment categories 
with different risk profiles, while the actual investment management is left to the 
company. This gives customers a choice to adjust their investment risk to their age or 
other aspects of their economic situation. 
  
The demand for unit-linked products has grown considerably in recent years, although it 
has not reached the levels found in other European countries. Unit-link products offer 
customers a choice of investment funds with varying policies as well as a choice of fund 
managers.  However, most of the unit-linked products used in Denmark carry some sort 
of protection against investment risk, usually a zero-rate guarantee. In addition, most 
customers have opted for products where the investment policy is determined by the fund 
managers. Thus a fair interpretation of the Danish unit-link market would be that 
customers have not chosen unit-link products because of the investment choice but rather 
because of the higher degree of transparency that these products offer. This represents a 
partial move away from extensive risk sharing, a partial correction that may be fully 
justified in the light of the large fall in guaranteed returns. 
 
H.   Replacement Ratios 
 
Money's Worth Ratios are difficult to calculate in the Danish system because of the 
extensive reliance on bonus payments. An ex ante calculation would need to be based on 
assumed rates of future performance and bonus declaration, while an ex post calculation 
would require a considerable amount of data on actual bonus payments. However, while 
MWRs are not calculated, considerable effort is devoted in Denmark in calculating 
current and future replacement ratios. 
 
These are also based on assumptions about future performance and bonus payments but 
they take into account all types of pension benefits and even allow for tax payments. Two 
reports, one from the Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs
7 and the other from the 
Danish Pension Council
8, provide details of current and expected replacement ratios. 
Although the two reports adopt slightly different methodologies, their basic results are 
broadly similar. 
 
                                                 
7 “Increased freedom of choice in pension saving”, May 2003. 
8 “Pension contributions, replacement ratios and mortality”, June 2005. 
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Figure 6 Average expected replacement ratios for different groups of education in 
2000 and 2045 
 
  Less educated   Skilled  Highly educated 
The blue part is public pension and the pink part is private pension. 
Source: Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (2003). 
 
The average replacement ratio is expected to increase in the future irrespective of 
education (and income). For persons with a shorter education, the replacement ratio will 
increase from 80 percent in 2000 to almost 100 percent in 2045 (Figure 6). For highly 
educated persons it is projected to reach a little less than 90 percent in 2045. The reason 
for the shift in replacement ratios is the widening coverage of occupational pensions, 
which will affect in particular the lower income groups. For all groups, private pensions 
will play a more important role in the future, but the social pension will still represent the 
major source of income for pensioners with a modest income even in 2045.  
 
Table 12  Average Disposable Income of Pensioners, 2000 and 2045 
Singles Couples  (1,000 DKK)  2000 2045  2000  2045 
Social pension and housing subsidy  101  86  69  53 
Private pension benefits  37  78  42  98 
ATP and SP  6  23  6  26 
Capital income  34  18  35  25 
Tax -45  -63  -43  -65 
Disposable income  134  143  109  137 
Note: 65-69-year-old in 2045 and 68-72-year-old in 2000. Only couples with both persons in the mentioned 
groups are included which simply give a sample of the pensioners in 2000. It shall be mentioned that the 
figures for ATP and SP for 2045 is already very uncertain to come true because contributions to the SP-
scheme for the moment is suspended and SP might be totally abolished in a couple of years.  
Source: The Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (2003). 
 
By looking at the income composition for average pensioners in 2000 and 2045, the same 
picture is evident as in Figure 6: the growing importance of private pension benefits at 
the expense of social pensions will be more evident in the future. Table 12 splits the 
pensioners in singles and couples which give a quite significant change in the income 
composition. Couples will on average experience a shift in the primary income source 
from public to private pensions in 2045 (even though ATP and SP are added to social 
pension and housing subsidy). In contrast, even though singles will be less dependent on 
social pensions in 2045 than in 2000, social pensions are still projected to be their 
primary income source at that time. 
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A more detailed approach is made by the Danish Pension Council. They show 
replacement ratios for different contribution rates and income groups for singles and 
couples (Figure 7), though only for 2003.  
 
Figure 7 shows that people living as a couple each has a smaller replacement ratio than 
singles for the same income and contribution rate. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
income related supplement in the social pension is at a minimum for couples because of 
the design of the scheme.
9 
 
Figure 7  Calculated Replacement Ratios  
 
 Singles  Couples 
 
 
Blue: Social pensions, Red: Occupational pensions, Residual: ATP and SP 
Source: The Danish Pension Council 
 
For low income people, a high replacement ratio can be reached with even a relative low 
contribution rate, not least because the social pension and ATP play a relatively large 
role. To reach the same replacement ratio for high income people, it takes a much higher 
contribution rate (more than three times as much). This large difference can in part be 
attributed to the absence of personal (individual pillar III) pensions in the calculations, 
which underestimates the replacements ratios for high income groups. Personal pensions 
are more prevalent for high income groups, as shown in Table 13. Allowing for Pillar III 
pensions, the differences in replacement ratios among different income groups would be 
smaller than depicted by the Danish Pension Council. 
 
 
                                                 
9 The social pension supplement is based on the household’s total income.  
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Table 13 Contributions to personal and occupational pension schemes in 2003 by Income 
Group 
Pension scheme  Personal Pensions Occupational Pensions 
    
Income (DKK)  Fraction Amount Fraction Amount 
    (per cent) (DKK) (per cent) (DKK) 
    
Up to 150,000  19 20,600   14 12,700 
150,000-249,999 33 11,500   70 19,300 
250,000-349,999 35 15,700   82 31,300 
350,000-449,999 35 20,600   84 45,900 
450,000-549,999 36 28,500   84 59,100 
550,000-649,999 39 38,700   81 76,200 
650,000 and above  44 52,300   80 147,700 
Total   31 16,400   60 29,700 
Note: The fraction shows how many persons in the age of 25-64 in a certain group of income who have 
contributed to a personal or an occupational pension scheme in 2003. The amount is the average amount for 
those who contributed to a pension scheme in 2003. 
Source: Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs (2005). 
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III.   REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 
 
A.   Overview 
 
Like providers of all financial services, pension institutions are subject to heavy 
regulation, the aim of which is to protect the interests of policyholders and members of 
pension plans - and to promote a competitive and efficient market for pension saving 
products, both during the accumulation and payout phases.  
 
The regulatory environment deals with several main issues, such as: 
 
•  Consumer protection through detailed legislation as to how policyholders and 
members must be informed about the terms and conditions of their contracts 
before and after accepting them;  
•  Solvency rules and rules on assets eligible for covering technical provisions; 
•  Rules on stress testing; 
•  The release of market information aimed at the public, investors and 
policyholders, i.e. accounting rules and key performance indicators. 
 
Denmark is a member of the European Union and its legislation is therefore based on EU 
directives - i.e. for solvency, accounting, and freedom of services across borders. 
However, as a general principle, EU directives are minimum directives. They provide 
broad guidance and leave ample room for detailed provisions to be determined by 
national authorities.  
 
As already mentioned, there are only few legal differences between life insurance 
companies and other pension institutions in pillars II and III. They nearly all provide 
defined contribution schemes on a fully funded basis. Hence, they fall under the scope of 
the EU Life Insurance Directives. Corporate pension funds in the sense known from other 
European countries (i.e., closely integrated into a particular company) do exist, but they 
play a very marginal role.  
 
In the local Danish regulation, all pension institutions, where they are established as life 
insurance companies or pension funds, are subject to the Financial Services Act (the main 
law governing all financial services) and to all secondary legislation established as a 
consequence of this act. Therefore, they are all subject to the same legislation on the 
contribution principle, to the same investment and solvency rules, to the same accounting 
framework, stress testing requirements and so on. Any differences primarily mirror 
institutional differences - i.e., pension funds have no external shareholders and do not pay 
dividends and hence they are not subject to company taxation rules in contrast to 
commercial life insurance companies. 
 
For a number of reasons the Danish rules on these issues deserve attention. First of all, in 
pension systems relying more or less on private pension provision, there must be an 
economic framework governing accounting and solvency. Secondly, the underlying 
economic regulatory environment of the Danish life insurance and pension business is to 
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a large extent based on providing information to the markets, thereby, contributing to 
market efficiency. In this respect the Danish rules and in particular the full fair value 
model of the accounting rules and the stress testing regime represent an early and 
pragmatic implementation of principles and ideas which are still debated in many other 
countries. Thirdly, in the EU area both the solvency and the accounting rules are 
presently going through a thorough examination in order to become more market-based 
and risk sensitive. The Danish experiences give valuable input to this process. 
 
This chapter deals with the basic regulation of life insurance companies and pension 
funds which guides their economic decision-making. In other words, legislation relating 
to consumer information and more general legal issues will not be dealt with. Issues to be 
discussed include: 
 
•  Investment rules 
•  Valuation Rules 
•  Capital rules 
•  Technical Provisions 
•  Solvency Margin 
•  The Traffic Light System 
 
B.   Solvency Rules, Investment Rules and Stress Testing 
 
Like the accounting rules and the general approach to regulation of insurance activity in 
Denmark, the solvency rules for Danish life insurance companies and pension funds are 
identical. The rules are based on the European Union directives. Since the European 
directives represent minimum requirements, the different member states have the option 
to impose other (tighter) rules on the companies under their jurisdiction. 
 
The solvency requirements for life insurance, in Denmark and in the EU, represent 4 
percent of the technical provisions plus a requirement on the sums insured - adding to 
approximately five percent of technical provisions. Under the fair value accounting rules, 
the technical provisions represent the sum of the guaranteed benefits, the bonus potential 
on future premiums and the bonus potential on premiums paid (as further detailed below).  
 
However, the current solvency rules - based on European directives - are not risk based. 
The required solvency margin is only reduced to 1 percent when the institution does not 
bear the investment risk, as for example in unit-linked products that are offered without 
any guarantees. If the product in question contains any guarantee on the return, meaning 
that the insurer bears some of the investment risk, the solvency requirement is as 
described above. Thus, a contract with a guaranteed return of 0 percent implies the same 
solvency requirement as a contract with a guaranteed return of 4.5 percent - 
notwithstanding that the latter contract clearly exposes the insurer to a larger risk. 
 
The solvency requirement has to be met with available capital at least equal to this 
requirement. Available capital is defined to include shareholders funds - assets less 
liabilities - with some additions and reductions. Subordinated loans and Special Bonus 
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Provisions (type B) count as available capital when certain conditions are met. Special 
Bonus Provisions belong to policyholders, but are counted as part of the capital covering 
the solvency requirement. They bear the same risk and remuneration as equity capital. 
Special Bonus Provisions (type A) resemble subordinated loans. However, they have so 
far not been used by any life insurance company or pension fund. 
 
On the asset side, quantitative limits apply. Especially, there are restrictions on the share 
of assets which can be made up of so-called "risky assets", notably equities. Moreover, 
quantitative limits are applied in order to reduce concentration risks. For example, 
quantitative limits apply to the possible exposure to one issuer of mortgage bonds or the 
proportion of total assets which might be invested in the securities of just one company or 
a group of closely related companies.   
 
While quantitative limits still apply, there has over a number of years been a gradual 
move toward regulation based more on the Prudent Person Principle (PPP). The PPP 
implies that greater emphasis is placed on the pension institution behaving prudently, 
controlling and monitoring risk, rather than on specific quantitative limits. 
 
Especially, over a longer time span, the share of assets which can be invested in "risky 
assets", like equities, has been increased. In 2001 the proportion of assets covering 
technical provisions, which could be invested in risky assets, was raised from 50 to 70 
percent. The reason for the increase was that some institutions had reached the former 
ceiling of 50 percent and still wanted more freedom to invest. 
 
The increase, however, was not granted without conditions. It was accompanied by a 
political wish that the actual share of risky assets in the portfolio should be considered 
against so-called "objective criteria - in the sense that the share of risky assets should be 
based upon an assessment of the company's actual capital strength measured against its 
risks on investments and commitments".  
 
These objective criteria were implemented in terms of the so-called system of traffic 
lights known from the banking sector (a political aim was to ensure that identical 
investment risks in different financial sub-sectors would imply the same solvency 
requirement). Since the introduction of the traffic light stress testing, the share of risky 
assets (equities) has steadily fallen, mainly because of adverse market developments. 
 
The traffic lights are described below. The flexibility in the current investment regulation 
is so great that asset allocation strategies are probably more influenced by internal 
asset/liability considerations and capital rules (like the traffic light system) than by 
investment rules and limitations per se. 
 
C.   Register of Assets Covering Technical Provisions 
 
All life insurance companies and pension funds have to keep a register of the assets 
covering technical provisions. At any time there must be assurance that the company in 
question holds enough assets to cover its technical provisions. A certain procedure and 
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guidance exists as to how the register must be kept, monitored and approved by the 
company's auditor. Moreover, the supervisor will occasionally check that all regulations 
pertaining to the register are met. 
 
The register is the Danish way of implementing the so-called winding-up directive from 
the European Commission. It serves to ensure that there are assets to cover technical 
provisions in case of a winding up procedure, if a company faces severe solvency 
problems. The registered assets in this case serve to fulfill obligations toward the 
policyholders, i.e., before liabilities toward any creditors are met.  
 
D.   Valuation Rules - Assets 
 
The Danish accounting rules for life insurance and pension institutions are often termed 
market-value accounting rules. On the asset side the fair value model reflects the fact that 
all assets must be measured at their market value by using observable market prices or by 
using a valuation technique in the case of non-active markets. For the majority of assets - 
like shares and bonds - there is an active market where the assets are traded, giving rise to 
observable market prices. For property an economic model is used to provide an estimate 
of the market price. For the remaining assets - like unlisted shares - a best estimate for the 
market price must be applied. 
  
One can always discuss whether the price information from financial markets truly reflect 
market values and how ownership issues - like pricing dominating ownership - should be 
dealt with in a market-value environment. This gives rise to the ongoing controversy 
about the distinction between market and fair values; however, this is a separate issue 
beyond the scope of this paper. In the following the terms, market value and fair value, 
are used interchangeably.   
 
The road towards market valuation on assets was completed in 2002. In 1995 life 
insurance companies had been given the option to measure property at market value, and 
in 1998 it was made mandatory to value shares and property at fair values. Bonds which 
made up a large part of assets in most pension institutions had to be measured at 
"mathematical values", where the market price was increased until maturity assuming a 
constant interest rate as of the day of purchase. In 2002 it became mandatory to also 
measure bonds at their current market price. 
 
Hence, since 2002 all assets in life insurance companies and pension funds have been 
measured at fair value with value changes - realized and unrealized - shown in the profit 
and loss account. 
 
E.   The Prevalence of With-Profits Contracts 
 
Before discussing the evolving rules on the valuation of liabilities, two important features 
of the Danish scene need to be noted. These are the prevalence of with-profits contracts 
and the use of the so-called contribution principle.  
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Until recently almost all pension contracts in the Danish market were contracts with 
participation features, meaning that policyholders were entitled to guaranteed benefits 
and to a share (bonus) of any surplus realized by the pension institution. This was the 
case for both pillar II (occupational) and pillar III (personal) pension schemes. 
 
Over the past few years market trends have changed. New contracts are increasingly 
written without the with-profits feature and minimum guaranteed benefits. However, for 
many years to come the majority of the portfolio of contracts will be with-profits based. 
 
An important feature of the traditional life insurance and pension products in the Danish 
market is the smoothing of returns allocated to policyholders over time. Policyholders do 
not receive the return obtained by the pension institution in a given year. Instead, pension 
institutions aim to increase benefit entitlements steadily over the years. Hence, in years 
when financial markets provide high returns, reserves are boosted to provide cover for 
years of financial distress. And in years when financial markets provide only low or even 
negative returns (i.e., returns may be lower than corresponding to the guaranteed return), 
individual policyholder benefits are maintained by drawing from the reserves.  
 
This smoothing of returns attributed to individual policyholders is called an "average 
interest rate environment", signaling that returns are evened out across policyholders and 
over time. The system has served to provide policyholders with confidence and clarity as 
to their financial situation upon retirement or in case an insured event occurs.  
 
The system has, however, come under strain in recent years, not least due to the financial 
market turmoil in the early years after 2000. Moreover, the smoothing of returns and the 
use of guaranteed benefits have met criticism from academics and politicians. The latter 
have claimed that the provision of guaranteed returns to policyholders conflicts with an 
optimal asset allocation, because pension institutions are given incentives to achieve 
stable market returns instead of balancing expected return against risk over a longer time 
horizon. Following this argument, the composition of a pension portfolio will be skewed 
towards bonds and other "safe assets" and away from "risky assets", like shares.  
 
Another claim has been that the average interest rate environment leads to an 
unacceptable redistribution of returns among policyholders. Depending on the relative 
level of investment returns and guaranteed rates, the redistribution may flow from older 
to younger policyholders or vice versa. For example, it has been claimed that older 
policyholders (who signed contracts in years when interest rates and financial market 
returns were relatively high) have in effect been paying for part of the returns provided to 
younger policyholders (who joined the system when obtainable market returns were 
lower) - because at a given point in time both groups receive the same return. 
However, as discussed below, when investment returns are below guaranteed rates, 
redistribution may flow in the opposite direction. 
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F.   Use of the Contribution Principle 
 
It is important to note, however, that within the average interest rate environment pension 
institutions are not free to redistribute market returns as they wish - neither among 
policyholders nor between policyholders on the one hand and owners on the other hand. 
The redistribution possibilities are closely regulated by the so-called contribution 
principle. 
 
An important risk facing the traditional guaranteed products is the risk of systematic 
biases in the distribution of bonuses across different generations of insured. Under 
normal conditions, the use of minimum guarantees smoothes out the fluctuations of the 
market rate into a more stable interest rate, so that increases in the guaranteed benefits do 
not fluctuate from year to year as much as market rates do. This stability in the 
development of the benefits is seen as one of the major attributes of minimum guarantees.  
 
However, in periods of declining interest rates, this technique implies the risk of 
systematic transfers from younger to older generations. This is because older generations 
may benefit from guarantees based on a higher interest rate than younger members. The 
contribution principle regulates the distribution of bonus results between shareholders 
and policyholders and among different generations of policyholders.  
 
The contribution principle states that policyholders are entitled to a fair share of the 
surplus (bonus) established as a result of the use of prudent assumptions. Policyholders 
are entitled to bonuses in relation to how the premiums have contributed to income in the 
company.  
 
The contribution principle consists of two elements. The first element relates to the 
distribution between the owners of the company and the policyholders as a group ("the 
principle of calculation according to contribution"). The owners have contributed with 
own funds, which may be shareholder capital or so-called Special Bonus Provisions 
(policyholder funds which under certain requirements fulfill the role of capital, i.e., the 
provisions that form part of the capital covering the solvency margin). Consequently the 
owners are entitled to a share of income corresponding to the capital they have invested.  
 
Policyholders are on the other hand entitled to a share of the income generated that 
corresponds to the premiums they have paid in and the accumulated interest and bonuses 
added to the premiums in the course of the contracts.
10 Income is not divided 
mathematically in the same relation as the relation between the amounts “invested” by 
policyholders and shareholders respectively. It is accepted that there is an added mark-up 
to the part allocated to shareholders as a payment for the risk taken by share capital.  
 
It is required that the companies notify to the supervisory authority their policy for 
allocation between owners and policyholders. Pension institutions have some discretion 
                                                 
10 The company in question may allocate specific assets to the shareholder capital and receive the yields on 
those assets. 
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regarding their allocation policy but subject to a legal requirement to respect the overall 
objective of fairness in relation to policyholders. 
 
The principle of calculation according to contribution states that the “realized result” 
must be divided between owners and policyholders so that the part accruing to the 
portfolio of insurance contracts is reasonable in relation to the manner in which the 
portfolio contributed to this result. The realized result is defined as the difference 
between the actual result of income and expenses, gains and losses in a given time period 
and the same result as it would have been if things had developed in accordance with the 
prudent assumptions inherent in the contracts.  
 
The measurement principle used for assets is crucial for the determination of the realized 
result. The use of fair values means that all value changes on assets are reflected in the 
realized result and must be divided between policyholders and owners. There are no 
hidden values serving to cushion the volatility of financial markets in the accounts and in 
the realized results.  
 
According to the principle of calculation according to contribution, the life insurance 
company shall divide the own funds' part of the realized results into one part related to 
the return on own funds, and one part reflecting the extent of the risk incumbent on own 
funds (a risk margin to the own funds). In the notification to the supervisor, an 
explanation shall be given of how the part stated in the notification is reasonable 
compared to the risk incumbent on own funds.  
 
This risk margin can not always be distributed to the own funds. A larger part to owners 
than to policyholders may only be distributed to own funds, when this larger part plus the 
amounts distributed to the insurance portfolio can be covered by positive realized results 
for the year. If the realized result for the year is not sufficient to allow distribution to own 
funds of the part of the realized results warranted by the principles of calculation, the 
company may rectify the situation in future years if the realized results permit this.   
 
The other element of the contribution principle is the allocation among policyholders 
("the principle of distribution according to contribution"). Policyholders have different 
contracts with different terms. The amounts allocated to the individual policyholder do 
not necessarily correspond exactly to the amounts relating to the individual contract. The 
size of the allocated amounts could reflect different risks associated with a specific type 
of contract. In relation to the principle of distribution according to contribution, the 
executive order implies that "redistribution of significant financial amounts shall not take 
place between insurance contracts, beyond the amounts following from the coverage of 
risks included in the insurance contracts". 
 
The companies have discretion regarding the timing of the allocation to individual 
contracts. They can retain the bonuses to a certain extent for prudential reasons, but this 
prudential consideration should be balanced towards the principle that bonuses should be 
released to individual policyholders in the course of the contract in a way that ensures a 
fair distribution between policyholders with different characteristics. 
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G.   Valuation Rules - Liabilities 
 
There is no active market for insurance liabilities and therefore no readily observable 
market price. For years this has been a major argument against the introduction of market 
valuation principles in life insurance in many countries. There is no internationally 
accepted fair value model for life insurance liabilities. And the problem is real: how can 
market rates for liabilities be established without the existence of either a market or a 
close substitute of a market? The Danish government took up this challenge in 1998. 
 
In 1998 the government set up a special Market Value Committee comprised of 
representatives from the supervisory authority, which held the chairmanship, the life 
insurance and pension industry, the actuarial profession and the accounting profession. 
The task of this committee was to create a suitable model for the measurement of life 
insurance and pension liabilities when all assets are measured at fair value. The 
committee was given four years to complete this assignment. 
 
In the end the Committee solved its task and reached consensus on a suitable model for 
the valuation of life insurance and pension liabilities, though after lengthy discussion and 
debate. The completion of the work of the Committee and the introduction of "The 
Danish Model" does not imply that a general solution has been found to the complex and 
internationally unsolved issues of how to fair value life insurance and pension liabilities 
without a well-functioning market for those liabilities. Instead, the Danish model 
represents a pragmatic response to the question of how to find a workable measurement 
method for these liabilities when assets are measured at fair value. 
 
Decomposition of Technical Provisions 
 
The work undertaken in the Danish Market Value Committee led to a decomposition of 
the traditional liabilities (technical provisions) into several components:  
 
•  The guaranteed benefits measure the difference between the market value of the 
benefits guaranteed according to the terms of the insurance and pension contract 
and the market value of the future premiums to be paid. 
•  The bonus potential on future premiums measures the market value of the excess 
return over the guaranteed benefits which will arise from the future premiums. 
This bonus potential is calculated as the difference between the market value of 
the guaranteed benefits on premiums paid and the market value of the guaranteed 
benefits. If this difference turns out to be negative, it is set at zero. 
•  The bonus potential on premiums paid measures the market value of the excess 
return over the guaranteed benefits which arise on premiums which have already 
been paid. This bonus potential is calculated as the difference between the 
technical provision and the guaranteed benefits on paid up premiums. If this 
difference turns out to be negative, it is set at zero. 
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Furthermore, the collective bonus measures the value of bonuses which have been 
allocated to policyholders as a group on the basis of the principle of calculation according 
to contribution, but which have not yet been allocated to individual policyholders.  
 
The sum of guaranteed benefits, bonus potential on future premiums and bonus potential 
on premiums constitute the technical provisions, which form the base for calculating the 
solvency requirement. Collective bonus is not a part of the technical provisions and is, 
therefore, not taken into account for the computation of the solvency margin. 
 
Assumptions Governing Technical Provisions 
 
When measuring the components of technical provisions into the three elements 
mentioned - guaranteed benefits, bonus potential on future premiums and bonus potential 
on premiums paid - the accounting rules state that assumptions must be based on: 
 
•  The best estimate of relevant underwriting risks, i.e. mortality, morbidity etc.; 
•  The best estimate of market costs (administration costs) for which the insurance 
policies, on average, could be administered on conditions governing the market; 
•  A discount rate as prescribed by the supervisor (see separate section below). 
 
Hence, technical liabilities must be reported at their best estimate. There are no general 
assumptions which are to be used. The life insurance companies and pension funds must 
base measurement of their liabilities on their best estimates and take into account any 
future projected developments. In addition to the best estimates, a risk margin must be 
added. This risk margin is described in some detail below. 
 
One important assumption when measuring technical liabilities is the assumption about 
mortality. The supervisor does not stipulate any mortality table to be used. Each pension 
institution must base its liabilities on best estimates of mortality - however, the best 
estimate assumption is subject to supervision. 
 
If assumptions - like mortality assumptions - turn out to be unfavorable for the pension 
institution, because improvements in life expectancy have not been properly taken into 
account, then this risk must be borne by the institution and the policyholders in 
accordance with the terms of the underlying contracts. Although the supervisor is keeping 
a close eye on the key assumptions behind the best estimate calculations, ultimate 
responsibility does not rest with the supervisor nor the government, but with the pension 
institution.  
 
Under current circumstances, life expectancy is actually seen to be improving in 
Denmark. If the pension institutions do not take this development properly into account, 
they must still live up to the promises they have given (in the contracts). This might lead 
to losses on mortality assumptions. 
 
If this should be the case, any losses must be accounted for according to the contribution 
principle, and hence, the losses may be shared with policyholders. Moreover, any 
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surpluses on other assumptions - like costs - may alleviate the problem, still in 
accordance with the contribution principle.  
 
Concerning the guaranteed benefits, these are increased in accordance with the contracts 
(i.e., as mentioned in chapter I on entering the contract it is often stipulated that future 
premiums are also guaranteed in the sense that they give rise to guaranteed benefits). But 
there is no formal price or wage indexation. However, future wage increases give rise to 
increased premiums which often give rise to increases in guaranteed benefits - still, 
though, depending on the terms of the contract in question. 
 
Collective bonus acts as a buffer - both in relation to fulfilling the guarantees given and to 
absorbing losses according to the contribution principle. Collective bonus is not a 
residual, as the individual institution must assess the need for collective bonus in 
conjunction with a requirement to release surplus to the individual policyholders at 
reasonable terms over the contract period. The need for collective bonus, naturally, is 
quite dependent on the guarantees given: the higher the level of guarantees, the higher the 
need for collective bonus.  
 
It is important to note that, again in accordance with the contribution principle, the bonus 
potential on future premiums may be used to absorb losses. This is illustrated in the 
example below. 
 
H.   Market-Value Accounting Rules - Some Examples 
 
In the following examples only financial risks are considered. This is for simplicity only, 
and because the focus of attention in the Danish case has been on financial risks. The 
example could have been worked through with any of the risks involved in the life 
insurance and pension contract, i.e. also underwriting risks and cost risks. 
 
Assume a life insurance contract with 2 premium payments as shown in Figure 8. At time 
0 a premium of 100 is paid, and at time 10 (in ten years), another 100 is paid in premium. 
The contract terminates after 20 years when the benefit is paid to the policyholder as a 
lump sum.  
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Figure 8  The Insurance Contract 
1
The Insurance Contract
Premium (100) Premium (100)
01 02 0
1.5 %: Guaranteed pension total (251)




If the guaranteed benefits in 20 years are calculated with a technical interest rate of 1.5 
percent, the value at termination will be 251. Using a technical interest rate of 4.5 
percent, the value at termination will be 396. 
 
Clearly, the contract carrying guaranteed benefits calculated with a technical interest rate 
of 4.5 percent is more risky to the insurer than the contract carrying the lower technical 
interest rate. However, before the introduction of the fair value accounting rules, the 
difference in risk profile would not show up in the accounts. In the example shown 
below, the market rate of interest is assumed to be 4.5 percent. 
 
Figure 9  Balance Sheet Under the Old and the New Accounting System 
2































Under the old accounting rules, the balance sheet for the two contracts would be 
identical. Under the fair value accounting rules, the composition - though not the level - 
of technical provisions differs between the two contracts (Figure 9). 
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For the contract carrying a technical interest rate lower than the market interest rate (1.5 
percent), the guaranteed benefits can be calculated at 40. This figure corresponds to the 
251 measured at present value, discounted for 20 years with the market interest rate of 
4.5 percent and reduced with the present value of the future premium. On the paid up 
premium (100) the insurer must give the insured a return of 1.5 percent. As the market 
interest rate is 4.5 percent and therefore, exceeds the guaranteed rate by 3.5 percent, it 
gives rise to a bonus potential on premiums paid of 44, which is the difference between 
the paid up premium (100) and the market value of the guaranteed benefits on the paid up 
premium (56). Likewise, if the market interest rate stays at 4.5 percent, there will be a 
bonus potential on the future premium (16), which is the difference between the 
guaranteed benefits on the paid up premium (56) and the guaranteed benefits of 40. The 
three elements of life insurance provisions, i.e., guaranteed benefits, bonus potential on 
the future premium and bonus potential on premiums paid all add up to 100, which is the 
paid up premium. The bonus potential is positive because the market interest rate is 
assumed to be above the guaranteed rate giving rise to buffer elements.  
 
For the contract where the guaranteed benefits are calculated at the same rate as the 
market interest rate, there is no bonus potential. Hence the value of the guaranteed 
benefits will be equal to the paid-up premium of 100, corresponding to the present value 
of 396. 
 
Effects of Changes in the Market Interest Rate 
 
In the following we will show how market-induced changes in the interest rate affect the 
fair value accounting of the two contracts. For simplicity it is assumed that there is only 
one premium payment (at inception), with the result that we can leave out the bonus 
potential on future premiums. The contracts run for 20 years. The starting point for the 
example is shown below (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10  Starting Point 
3
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Assume that the market interest rate drops from 4.5 to 3.5 percent and that a 1 percentage 
point change in the interest rate gives rise to an opposite change in the value of bonds of 
10 percent (Figure 11). On the asset side, this gives rise to an (unrealized) gain of 8. On 
the liability side the value of the guaranteed benefits increase, because the future benefits 
are discounted at a lower market interest rate. Correspondingly, the room for future bonus 
has decreased. 
 
























For the low risk contract, the new market interest rate is still above the rate used for 
calculating the guaranteed benefits indicating that there is still a buffer in terms of bonus 
potential on premiums paid. Thus, the value of guaranteed benefits increases, but does 
not exceed the paid up premium of 100 leaving room for a bonus potential, which is, 
however, decreased to 32. The gain in the value of the bond portfolio (8) is split between 
the insured and the shareholders in line with the principle of calculation according to 
contribution, leaving 1 for equity and 7 for the insured (hence increasing the collective 
bonus). 
 
For the high risk contract, the new market interest rate is now below the rate used for 
calculating future benefits. The potential for bonus is negative; however, the bonus on 
premiums paid has a floor of 0. The value of guaranteed benefits rises to 121, i.e. the total 
value of technical provisions increases above 100. The increase of 21 less the asset gain 
of 8 (13) represents a loss, a negative realized result, and therefore a positive amount 
cannot be allocated to equity. The loss must be divided between shareholders and the 
insured in line with the principle of calculation according to contribution. However (more 
than) the total negative result is attributed to the insured, and the value of collective 
bonus is written down with the full amount of the loss. 
 
Clearly the fair value accounting system reveals the difference in the risk profile between 
the two contracts.  
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Assume instead that the market interest rate increases to 5.5 percent. The resulting 
balance sheet is shown below (Figure 12). 
 
























The increase in the market interest rate represents a loss in the value of the bond portfolio 
on the asset side. On the liability side, the value of guaranteed benefits decreases for both 
contracts, while the bonus potential increases, reflecting a bigger potential for future 
bonus for both contracts. For both contracts the sum of guaranteed benefits and bonus 
potential is 100. 
 
The loss in the value of the bond portfolio must be divided between equity and the 
insured on the basis of the principle of calculation according to contribution. Equity is 
reduced by 1 and collective bonus by 7.   
 
Effects of Changes in Equity Prices 
 
Let us turn to the balance sheet effects of a drop in the market value of shares. If shares 
drop by 20 percent to 40 there is no effect on the technical provisions. The loss of 10 
must be divided between equity and the insured. Equity is reduced with 1 and collective 
bonus with 9 (Figure 13).    
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Figure 13  Balance Sheet After Stocks Fall by 20 percent 
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In this case, the collective bonus is of a size enabling the cover of the fall in the value of 
shares. But assume share prices were to fall by 40 percent instead of 20 percent (Figure 
14). 
 
Figure 14  Balance Sheet After Stocks Fall by 40 percent 
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In this case the shares would be reduced in value by 20. The insured would have to cover 
18 and equity 2. But collective bonus can only cover 15. 
 
For the high risk contract this leaves the ultimate responsibility for covering the loss with 
the equity which is reduced from 10 to 5. Equity has covered 3 on behalf of 
policyholders. These 3 might be recaptured in future years in line with the contribution 
principle. But there is no assurance that the economic conditions and terms of the 
contract will actually render this possible. 
 
   - 42 -
For the low risk contract the bonus potential also vanishes. However, and very important, 
the principle of distribution according to contribution states that once the collective bonus 
has been used to absorb losses, the bonus on paid up premiums can be used to cover 
losses. Hence, the bonus on paid up premiums is reduced with 3, and the equity only 
covers its share of the loss, i.e. 2. 
 
Again, the inherent difference in risk profiles between the two contracts shows up in the 
fair value balance sheet. 
 
The fair value accounting rules enable management to better monitor the risks of the 
insurance portfolio and provide better and more relevant information for users, the media 
and the public. The benefits of this accounting system, however, go further than merely 
providing better accounting information. The fair value accounting rules also have real 
economic effects. In this regard, the possibility to use the bonus potential on paid up 
premiums to absorb losses also implies that the asset allocation can be better optimized 
for contracts carrying relatively low risk. 
 
I.   Guidance on Market Discipline  
 
As described in other parts of this paper, the Danish life and pension market is 
characterized by a relatively large number of life insurance companies and pension funds. 
Some are commercial companies trying to make a return to external shareholders; others 
are pension funds with no external shareholders; and others are formally set up as life 
insurance companies, but their shareholders contribute only a small amount of capital and 
do not expect a return on this capital.  
 
Despite these different organizational set ups, the companies are regulated under the 
same legal framework and competition is quite fierce. All institutions have to fulfill the 
same solvency requirements, and any institution experiencing growth must meet 
increasing solvency requirements - with capital provided from external shareholders, as 
subordinated loans, from policyholders, or in the form of retained surplus. 
 
One important issue in recent years has been the way in which the different life insurance 
companies and pension funds divide the result obtained in a given year between 
policyholders and equity. It has become a focus of attention in the media and an 
important parameter affecting the competitive environment among the companies. In 
order to improve market transparency and comparability the supervisor has issued a 
"Guidance on market discipline and notification of rules relating to the equity's share of 
the realized result in life insurance companies and pension funds". The focus point is the 
risk premium awarded to shareholders. 
 
The realized result must - in line with the principle of calculation according to 
contribution - be divided between the equity and the policyholders in order that the part 
accruing to the portfolio of insurance contracts is reasonable in relation to the manner in 
which the portfolio contributed to this result. The life insurance company shall submit to 
the supervisor the rules and assumptions applied for the calculation of the part of the 
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realized result that accrues to its equity. Returns on special bonus provisions (type B) 
shall be treated in the same way as equity.  
 
In the notification the company shall divide the equity's part of the realized result into one 
part related to the return on equity, and one part reflecting the extent of the risk 
incumbent on equity. In the notification an explanation shall be given of how the part 
stated in the notification is reasonable compared to the risk incumbent on equity. 
  
The aim of this regulation is not to establish rules (i.e. maximums) on the risk premium 
which can be allocated to shareholders. Instead, the supervisor intends to force the 
management to consider the risks facing the equity in order that the remuneration to both 
insured and equity becomes fair and based on clearly specified conditions. Moreover, it 
becomes possible to compare the risk premium to equity before and after the accounting 
year, thus attributing any difference to divergences between assumptions and actual 
economic developments.  
 
There is no obligation to follow the guidelines specified. However, if a notification of the 
risk premium to the supervisor does follow the guidelines, the supervisor will as a 
starting point not question the risk premium, and the supervisor will not ask for more 
explanations for the size and calculation of the risk premium. If a notification does not 
follow the guidelines, the supervisor will study the notification in order to evaluate 
whether the rules notified provide assurance and fairness to the insured.  
 
Thus, as a starting point it is expected that the guidelines are capable of establishing the 
transparency and comparability called for. The majority of institutions have chosen to 
stay within the rules and procedures in the guidance.  
 
The notification must be in place before the beginning of the accounting year. Among 
other things it must (on a comparable basis) be specified how much extra return could be 
awarded to the insured, if the equity was not rewarded with a risk premium. The 
company must specify the assumptions behind the calculation of the risk premium, into:  
 
•  Risks which are not specific to the company in question.  
•  Risks related to the business plan and strategy etc. for the specific company.  
 
The first category includes financial risks, biometric risks and risks relating to cost 
assumptions. If, for example, a company has issued contracts over the long term, 
guaranteeing life-long benefits, this might expose its equity capital to a relatively large 
risk when life expectancy increases (compared to a company where increasing life 
expectancy might lead to reduced benefits). Risks in the second category could be risks 
relating to the investment strategy and reinsurance program, etc. 
 
The notification must also specify the amount of the equity risk premium that will not be 
transferred to the equity capital because the result realized is not expected to be sufficient 
(a larger part to owners than to policyholders may only be distributed to own funds, when 
this larger part plus the amounts distributed to the insurance portfolio can be covered by 
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positive realized results for the year. If the realized result for the year is not sufficient to 
allow distribution to own funds of the part of the realized results warranted by the 
principles of calculation, the company may rectify the situation in future years if the 
realized results permit this).   
 
In the course of a given year a company is not allowed to change the principles and 
assumptions governing the calculation of the risk premium, if it is to stay within the 
scope of sufficient market discipline. However, at the end of each year the notification to 
the supervisor must be renewed, i.e. the company must consider whether a notification - 
and the arguments for the size of the equity risk premium - already in use are still 
applicable.   
 
No later than eight days after board approval of the way in which a given year's realized 
result will be allocated to policyholders and equity, the company must notify the 
supervisor as to the actual realized risk premium awarded to the equity. Hence, the 
expected and actual risk premium to the equity can be compared and any difference 
explained. 
 
J.   Evaluation of Experience with Guidance on Market Discipline 
 
The risk premiums to the equity and Special Bonus Provisions are made public by the 
supervisor (on the supervisor's home page).  
 
Experience is still quite limited as to whether the intentions of the guidance on market 
discipline - to force companies to consider the risks they are facing and to enable the 
market to discipline the size of the risk premium attributed to the equity - are actually 
reached. The rules have only been applied for a few years, and they have been amended a 
couple of times.  
 
It is clear, however, that it is difficult to really introduce transparency into the complex 
issue of how to calculate a reasonable reward to the risk of the equity in life insurance 
companies and pension funds. Many factors influence the size of this risk, and different 
companies have different strategies for the risk premium.  
 
So many companies are active in the market that even the seemingly easy task of 
presenting an overview of the rules and assumptions for calculating the risk premium 
across companies poses practical challenges. However, such practical difficulties can be 
overcome for those really interested in understanding the issue of risk premiums across 
the industry. 
 
Consumer interest in this issue is very limited for obvious reasons. Pensions are difficult 
to understand and technical issues, such as equity risk premiums, are not an issue which 
attracts the attention of the average consumer.  
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Instead, the question of fairness as to the allocation of the realized result between 
policyholders and shareholders has been a hot issue both in the media and in the ongoing 
competitive struggle among the companies.  
 
In the media, particular attention has been paid to those companies having notified 
relatively high equity risk premiums. Risk premiums have been compared across life 
insurance companies and pension funds, and those companies with relatively large risk 
premiums have been accused of allocating too much to shareholders, i.e., to breach the 
principle of fairness, which is the whole essence of the contribution principle. The claim 
has been that companies awarding high risk premiums to the equity are paying off 
shareholders with funds belonging to policyholders. The reasoning is that the risk 
premium is a payment (a cost) transferred from policyholders to shareholders, which 
must be taken into account when comparing costs across companies.  
 
Care must be taken about this reasoning, however. Different companies and pension 
funds have different needs. Some companies are in no need to and do not wish to build up 
their available capital (to match the solvency requirement) through the profit and loss 
account. Other companies must make a return to external shareholders which over time is 
sufficient to attract shareholder capital. Others again are growing fast and wish to meet an 
increasing capital requirement through policyholders' own funds (Special Bonus 
Provisions), which in the guidance are treated like equity.  
 
Moreover, the requirement that a risk premium may only be distributed to own funds, 
when this larger part plus the amounts distributed to the insurance portfolio can be 
covered by positive realized results for the year creates volatility in the risk premium. 
Amounts which the equity capital has actually earned but which it has not been possible 
to allocate to the equity because of insufficient realized results are transferred to a 
"shadow account". They are gradually released when future years' income (positive 
realized results) allow this. Hence, in a given year a part of the risk premium to the equity 
may come from earlier years. 
   
The use of the shadow account is one reason why the risk premium allocated to 
shareholders in a given life insurance company or pension fund - and the consideration 
whether that risk premium is reasonable - must be seen over a number a years. The 
underlying volatility of financial markets, which shows up in the accounts under fair 
valuation, is another reason. 
 
Finally, the risk premium is not a cost which is borne by policyholders and used for the 
remuneration of the equity. The risk premium is a payment to a factor of production - the 
capital at risk. The shareholders (including policyholders if they are contributing to the 
risk capital with Special Bonus Provisions) are contributing to the company being able to 
bear those risks which create an income that allows a risk premium to the equity. The risk 
premium represents an allocation of the realized result, not a transfer from policyholders 
to shareholders.  
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There is, however, no doubt that the guidance has served its purpose of forcing insurance 
companies and pension funds to consider the risk their equity is facing and what the price 
for running this risk should be. Over time and with forthcoming amendments to the 
guidance it may be expected that this important insight will also be introduced to other 
users of the guidance, not least the media. 
 
Also, by relying on transparency and competition instead of strict quantitative limits on 
the risk premium to equity, the guidance on market discipline rests on a sound approach 
which is well in line with the approaches to risk, accounting and solvency which 
international bodies like the European Commission are aiming for in these years. 
 
K.   Market Values and the Choice of Discount Rate 
 
An important feature of the measurement of liabilities at fair value is, naturally, that 
future cash flows must be discounted. This raises the important question of the choice of 
an appropriate discount rate.  
 
There was a lengthy discussion in the Market Value Committee on how the discount rate 
should be determined.  
 
It was concluded that the discount rate should not reflect the actual asset composition of 
the individual pension institution. There should be only one discount rate, equal for all 
actors in the market. Given this conclusion it was debated whether the rate should be a 
so-called risk free rate of interest or whether it could include some kind of credit risk. In 
the latter case the discount rate would reflect the credit standing of a high quality bond.  
 
Another conclusion was that the discount rate should be a market interest rate with the 
same term and in the same currency as the liability. In other words, the rate was to be 
based, in principle, on a yield curve, so as to ensure that in the discounting of future cash 
flows, the rate used was equal to the point (maturity) on the market yield curve that was 
equal, at the time of calculation, to the time period until the payment date for the payment 
in question. 
 
At the time of the introduction of the new fair value accounting rules, pension institutions 
were not, however, immediately prepared to apply a maturity-dependent discount rate, 
nor were they able to do so in practice. Under the rules in force at the time, pension 
institutions had been using discount rates that were independent of the maturity of 
liabilities. 
 
Against this background, it was made optional for pension institutions to decide whether 
to use a single rate (flat rate) or a maturity-dependent rate (yield curve) in the calculation 
of their liabilities. 
 
The executive order on accounting implementing the new fair value rules stipulated that 
in the valuation at fair value of guaranteed benefits, “the rate used should provide an 
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estimate of the return obtainable in the market. The Danish Financial Supervisory 
Authority shall prepare a set of guidelines for the determination of this rate.”  
 
The guidelines prepared in response to this provision made it optional for companies to 
decide whether to use a single rate (flat rate), determined in accordance with the 
provisions of the guidelines, or a zero-coupon yield curve.  
 
While rules were established for the calculation of the flat rate, no rules were specified 
for the determination of the yield curve for companies opting to use a yield curve rather 
than a flat rate. 
 
The flat discount rate was determined as the average of the yield on three government 
bonds weighted to ensure that their maturities correspond to 10 years – with the addition 
of a premium commensurate with the spread between a 10-year swap rate and a 10-year 
government bond yield. 
 
The accounting rules also stipulate that an adjustment for risk and uncertainty must be 
made. According to the fair value accounting rules, this adjustment represents: “The 
estimated price premium which the company must be expected to have to pay in the 
market to an acquirer of the company’s portfolio of insurance contracts in order for the 
acquirer to take on the risk of fluctuations in the size and payment dates of the guaranteed 
benefits”. This adjustment for risk and uncertainty can be made in the form of a 
deduction from the discount rate corresponding to five percent. 
 
The use of a government bond with the addition of a spread to the swap rate must be seen 
as a pragmatic choice, mirroring that the Danish rules for fair valuing liabilities first and 
foremost is a pragmatic response to assets being fair valued.  
 
Introduction of a Yield Curve 
 
In the course of 2003 some pension institutions showed interest in applying a yield curve 
to the measurement of insurance liabilities. Some institutions changed their notification to 
the supervisor and stated their intention of changing from the simple method described 
above to a yield curve. However, in the guidance from the supervisor as to the 
appropriate discount rate, it was only mentioned that a yield curve could be applied, 
leaving the details for the institution in question to decide and to notify to the supervisor. 
 
Hence, a situation could be foreseen whereby different institutions would apply different 
yield curves to their fair value measurement of liabilities. This was seen as a problem by 
the industry, because two different institutions with identical liabilities should recognize 
the same fair value of those liabilities.  
 
The basic approach to the Danish fair value accounting rules was that companies should 
notify the supervisor about their best estimate concerning a range of factors influencing 
the fair value of liabilities - these factors include mortality, morbidity, costs etc. These 
factors are specific to the individual company, and the companies should compete to 
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control and reduce such risks. However, this line of reasoning is not valid for the discount 
rate. The discount rate is a factor, which should be the same for all life insurance 
companies and pension funds. 
  
Therefore the trade association of the Danish life insurance companies and pension funds 
- the Danish Insurance Association - suggested to the authorities in late 2003 that rules 
governing the yield curve should be established. At the same time work was undertaken 
in order to make the Danish accounting rules so-called compatible with the accounting 
rules of the IASB, International Accounting Standards Board.  
 
Hence, a special task force was established with the mandate "To consider the principles 
to be included in a Danish IAS compatible set of accounting rules for determining 
discount rates to be used in the measurement of insurance and pension liabilities. To 
make recommendations based on these principles, for rules for estimation of a yield curve 
to be used by Danish insurance companies and pension funds in the measurement of their 
insurance and pension liabilities. The rules should be prepared so as to ensure, in so far as 
possible, that similar liabilities are measured at the same value in different companies. To 
that end, the Task Force is to consider current rules of significance to the choice of 
discount rate in the measurement of insurance and pension liabilities". 
 
The task force looked for guidance in the existing rules laid down by the IASB, but came 
to the conclusion that the existing accounting rules of the IASB did not provide enough 
guidance as to the rules governing the discount rate for measuring insurance liabilities.   
 
In the end, the task force recommended a model after which the yield curve is determined 
based entirely on the euro swap rate – allowance being made, however, for the difference 
between Euro rates and swap rates in DKK. There was a consensus among the Task 
Force members that a spread should be incorporated to reflect the difference between the 
Danish interest rate level and the euro rate level. The spread should be determined with a 
view to ensuring that it is as current as possible; at the same time, it should not, in so far 
as possible, be susceptible to be influenced by individual Danish interests. 
 
The advantage of the model would be that the yield curve reflects the most liquid interest 
rate market; thus the curve will not be influenced by individual Danish interest rates. 
There was also a consensus among the Task Force members that if, in special situations, 
the model chosen produces misleading statements relative to the Danish interest rate 
level, it should be possible for the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority to deviate 
from the model. 
 
The recommendations from the task force were followed, and starting from 1st January 
2005 the Danish supervisor on a daily basis started publishing the yield curve on its 
homepage. During a transitional period, the option remains to make use of the simplified 
method when discounting life insurance liabilities. However, as from 1 January 2009 all 
life insurance companies and pension funds must apply the yield curve (the yield curve is 
also applicable to non-life insurance companies to the extent that it is relevant to discount 
non-life insurance liabilities. This also applies to provisions for continuing benefits in 
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industrial injury insurance). The yield curve is delivered to the supervisor from the 
Danish National Bank, which has contracted with an international investment company to 
supply the underlying data and technical expertise to simulate the zero coupon bond yield 
structure. 
 
The yield curve thus obtained includes a small credit risk (reflecting the swap market, i.e. 
inter-bank credit risk), however not to the extent called for by the insurance industry. The 
Danish experience gives no clear guidance as to the choice of applying a risk-free rate for 
discounting or a rate including some credit risk. The very notion of a risk-free rate is 
rather theoretical, and there is no single risk-free interest rate. In short, the Danish yield 
curve is close to a risk-free term structure.  
 
The Danish experience shows first and foremost that the discount rate must be uniform 
across the industry and secondly, that it is possible to estimate a zero coupon bond 
structure and make it available to the market on a daily basis. 
 
L.   Treatment of Risk and Uncertainty  
 
As mentioned it was possible to apply a standard deduction of five percent from the 
discount rate in order to take into account risk and uncertainty in terms of cash flows. 
There was a consensus among the Task Force members that the size of the premium for 
risk, uncertainty and the value of guarantees should, in principle, be assessed and justified 
by each company and that the premium should be taken into account in the cash flows, 
rather than as a deduction in the discount rate. The Task Force members therefore 
proposed setting a time limit on the possibility of applying the five percent standard 
deduction. 
 
This proposal has been followed by the supervisor. The new accounting rules do not 
contain the five percent deduction method - the companies may still notify that the five 
percent will be applied, but now they must argue in the notification why this is 
appropriate. Moreover, the deduction does not have to take place in the discount rate, but 
could be applied to the cash flow, which is to be discounted. This represents a further 
move toward refining the life insurance accounting rules in the direction of "real" fair 
values. Whereas the discount rate should be uniform across the industry, this is not the 
case for the premium for risk and uncertainty. 
 
M.   The Traffic Light System 
 
The traffic lights system was introduced by the supervisor in 2001. The aim was to ensure 
that companies hold sufficient reserves to cover possible adverse market developments. 
The requirements were imposed on all life insurance companies and pension funds, not 
only those exceeding the former quantitative limit (50 percent) on the share of risky 
assets. 
 
The stress testing is divided into two scenarios: Yellow Test and Red Test. When a 
company does not fall into one of those two categories, it is deemed to be in a green light 
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situation, hence its capital base is adequate when measured against its potential to absorb 
possible adverse market developments.  
  
Both tests measure the capital strength against scenarios which are possible, but which 
have not occurred at the time the stress is performed. Measurement and reporting is done 
every half year. 
 
The yellow scenario is possible, but unlikely, whereas the red scenario is more likely 
(though still it is only a plausible scenario). The colors indicate that it is a serious matter 
if the plausible scenario poses capital problems (red light) whereas it is a less serious 
problem if the rather unlikely scenario (yellow light) poses capital problems.  
 




Interest Rate Risk 
 
Interest rate  Red Test  Yellow Test 
Short Duration < 1y  up/down 1.0% point  up/down 1.43% point 
Med Duration 1y<  <3.6y  up/down 0.85% point  up/down 1.18% point 
Long Duration  3.6y <  up/down 0.7% point  up/down 1.0% point 
 
The interest rate risk is calculated by the market value of the asset multiplied by the 
modified duration and multiplied by the change in the interest rate.  
 
Shares 
In the Red Test shares drop by 12 percent in value; in the Yellow Test by 30 percent. 
 
Credit Risk 
The credit risk is measured by applying credit risk weights on the different categories of 
bonds. Government bonds are assigned a weight of 0. Supra and Agency bonds are 
assigned weights between 0.10 and 0.01563 depending on class and duration. Corporate 
bonds are assigned a weight of 1. 
 
Currency Risk 
All uncovered positions in foreign currencies are measured with Value at Risk (VaR) on 
a 99 percent level in the Red Test and 99.5 percent in the Yellow Test. 
 
Default Risk (Derivatives) 
The risks on derivatives are calculated by using the market value multiplied by a weight 
depending on type and duration and finally multiplied by a factor a. The factor a depends 
on the classification of the security issuer. 
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Risks in Subsidiary Companies 
Risks in subsidiary companies are calculated with the same procedure as for the parent 
company. 
 
Risks Associated with Real Estate Properties 
Real estate properties are measured at market value according to accounting standards. 
The Red Test implies a decline of eight percent in value, the Yellow Test 12 percent. 
 
Taxation (Tax Assets) 
The profits of the year are taxed at a 15 percent rate according to the Danish Pension 
Yield Tax Act. A loss in the current year is deductible in the following year, and thereby 
creates the possibility of a tax-asset. 
 
Liability Risks (Insurance Provisions) 
The liabilities are treated differently from the assets since the discount rate is assumed 
only to move in parallel shifts, where the rate used is the zero coupon rate from the Euro 
Swap curve. The Red Test is up/down 0.7 of a percentage point and the Yellow Test 
up/down 1.0 percentage point. The risk in liabilities (insurance provisions) is defined as 
the difference in their level between before and after stress testing. 
 
Calculating the risk on assets 
The total risk of assets is obtained from the total by choosing the worst scenario in both 
Red Test and Yellow Test. 
 
Distribution of risk to the bonus reserves  
This is made in accordance with the contribution principle. 
 
Calculation of the excess Capital Base is made in the following order: 
i)  Deriving the Capital Base after distribution of risk  
ii)  Deducting the solvency margin of the Insurance Provisions before Stress Test 
adjusted for four percent of the change in the risk of the provisions in either Red Test or 
Yellow Test. 
iii)  Adding three percent of the Insurance Provisions before Stress testing. 
 
The calculations above will eventually yield the Excess Capital Base. 
 
N.   Evaluating the Traffic Light System  
 
Soon after the introduction of the scenario testing in the Danish life insurance and 
pension business, financial markets were hit by severe turmoil for several reasons. Life 
insurance companies and pension funds had to register huge losses on the shares in their 
portfolios. Likewise, the fall in interest rates to unprecedented levels created problems, 
because the dominating proportion of contracts outstanding were written with a 
guaranteed rate of return. 
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In this situation, a large number of institutions were in the yellow light and some were in 
the red light - for one company the situation turned out to be so severe that it encountered 
real problems in fulfilling the solvency requirement, and it was taken under special 
supervision by the authorities. 
 
A dilemma exposed itself in this time of critical market developments: shares had been 
falling in value and interest rates were at historically low levels - yet besides the official 
solvency requirement, pension institutions also had to test their capital base against a 
further worsening of the financial markets. Clearly, life insurance companies and pension 
funds had to reduce their risks - selling shares and buying financial instruments covering 
the risk of further declining interest rates - but was it justified in times of severe financial 
distress to test the capital base against the possibility of further negative market 
developments? Were not the traffic light scenarios imposing unwarranted and 
unnecessary restrictions on life insurance companies and pension funds? 
 
Under the old accounting rules the solvency problems would not have revealed 
themselves as it happened under the fair-value accounting rules. And the claim was made 
that the former accounting rules - and, hence, also the former solvency measurement - 
would have made the life insurance companies and pension funds better able to take a 
long-term view on their asset allocation against their liabilities. The former rules would 
not have forced the companies to sell risky assets in a falling market. In other words: 
would it matter in a time of severe financial distress that a life insurance company or 
pension fund became insolvent measured by today's market values, if the money to be 
paid out was due in 20 or 30 years, long after the financial crisis was gone? 
 
There was a lengthy debate on these crucial issues. And this debate is at the heart of fair-
value accounting: does it make sense to base the capital assessment, including stress 
testing, and the value of liabilities, on today's values in a business, which in its nature is 
as long term as life insurance and pension business?  
 
There is no single answer to this question. But the Danish argument would be that the 
apparent solvency protection under traditional accounting rules would be artificial. 
Transparency and insight into the underlying economic situation of life insurance 
companies and pension funds is provided by market valuation. However, the 
interpretation of market values and the need for supervisory action when applying fair-
value accounting must be carefully considered. 
 
In times of financial turmoil - falling share prices - less weight should be put on current 
market values than under normal market conditions. After all, at least in the Danish case, 
pension institutions are so influential on capital markets that a general intention on their 
part to reduce their risk would only add on to the financial turmoil (share prices would 
only fall further).   
 
Evaluated against experience the traffic light system in Denmark did a proper job in 
forcing life insurance companies and pension funds to consider the risks to which they 
are exposed. The proportion of shares in the portfolios of pension institutions was 
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reduced and financial instruments were bought in order to provide cover against further 
declines in the level of market interest rates. 
 
Moreover, the supervisor seems to have acted very reasonably to the results of the traffic 
light stress testing. Companies facing the red light seem to have been asked to reduce 
their risk. However, the supervisor has not interfered with management decisions and has 
not forced the selling of specific assets. And companies in the yellow light seem to have 
been able to rectify the situation without undue intervention from the supervisor. 
 
As such, the traffic light system of stress testing seems to have created better awareness 
by the management of life insurance companies and pension funds of the risks they are 
facing. The traffic light system is being improved on an ongoing basis, yet it seems today 
to actually influence the monitoring of risks in the insurance business. Moreover, the 
traffic lights have pushed towards the increasing trend of relying on products with lower 
or no guaranteed return. 
 
So far, the stress test deals only with financial risk while underwriting risk is not 
included. However, in an annex to the annual accounts information must be given on the 
impact of possible adverse developments in underwriting risks, and this information 
comes quite close to resembling the stress test. It is possible that underwriting risk will be 
included in the stress test at a later time. 
 
O.   Risk-Based Capital Requirements 
 
The system of stress testing in Denmark is another example of the Danish regulatory 
rules being forward looking. In the future European solvency regulation, known as 
Solvency II, it is emphasized that stress testing will be an important part. While the 
introduction of the stress test gave rise to some tension between the supervisor and the 
industry, the stress test today - after some modifications - is seen as relatively pragmatic 
and supportive to the overall risk management.  
 
The use of stress testing is also well in line with a risk-based approach to solvency 
regulation. Companies are allowed to hold large amounts of risky assets like shares if 
their capital base supports those assets. And companies, which have covered the 
guarantees they have issued with financial instruments - as many have in recent years - 
see their hedging activities reflected in the results of the stress test. 
 
The Danish regulation concerning the use of financial instruments, by the way, is also 
forward looking. Only the general rule applies that financial instruments may be taken 
into use as long as they serve to reduce the total asset/liability risk. 
 
In many ways the Danish life insurance regulation is already to some extent risk based. 
And the supervisor's approach to solvency regulation is that it should be risk based. The 
supervisor would like to introduce lower capital requirements than today's requirements 
in cases where this would be reasonable, measured against the use of financial 
instruments, prudence in asset allocation, and offer of guaranteed returns. However, as 
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mentioned earlier, the solvency requirements as laid down in the EU directives are not 
risk based.  
 
One important change is considered within the limits set by the EU directives. As 
mentioned in section 3.3 the so-called bonus potential on paid up premiums may serve as 
a buffer to absorb losses when certain conditions are met. But the bonus potential on paid 
up premiums forms part of the technical provisions against which the capital requirement 
is calculated. The question has been raised why a capital requirement is enforced against 
a liability item which serves as a buffer to cover losses. 
 
Currently the supervisor is considering leaving the potential on paid up premiums out of 
the technical reserves when calculating the solvency requirement, a change that is within 
the scope of EU regulation. If this change is implemented, it will lead to lower solvency 
requirements for those life insurance companies and pension funds which have issued 
contracts with relatively low levels of guaranteed returns - hence, it would reward 
companies facing relatively low risks. Clearly, this would be a further step toward risk-
based capital requirements. 
 
The supervisor has stated that a change in this direction would be followed by a 
requirement for every life insurance company and pension fund to evaluate and report to 
the supervisor the capital requirement which the company itself would deem appropriate - 
a so-called "individual capital assessment". This has already been introduced for banks. 
 
Such a requirement will most likely also become part of the Solvency II requirements.  
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IV.   EFFICIENCY OF RISK SHARING ARRANGEMENTS  
 
A.   Introduction  
 
Like multi-pillar systems in other countries, the three pillars of the Danish pension 
system differ regarding the risks borne by members (active workers and pensioners), 
pension institutions and the government. One of the fundamental advantages of multi-
pillar systems is that they spread the relevant risks widely. This section discusses the 
efficiency of risk-sharing arrangements in Denmark, with particular focus on the 
distinguishing characteristics of the Danish system. 
  
When assessing the risk sharing arrangements of a pension system, the risks borne by 
active workers and pensioners are usually analyzed separately. But in the Danish case, 
the risks of the two groups are analyzed together because of the specific features of such 
arrangements in Denmark. This applies to the risks borne by members in pillar II and III 
schemes, which are fully funded and based on defined contribution plans. Risks in pillar 
I, which is an unfunded "pay-as-you-go" scheme, differ between active workers and 
pensioners. 
 
B.   Risks Faced by Active Workers and Pensioners 
 
The main risk facing the first pillar of the Danish pension system is political. This is the 
risk that the authorities may lower the level of the social pension (and the supplement 
which, as discussed above, is received by a large number of pensioners) either by 
lowering the pension amount in nominal terms or, more likely, by failing to maintain its 
real value relative to changes in prices and wages.  
 
This risk may be subdivided into two: a pure political risk and a financial risk. The first 
relates to the risk that pension amounts may be lowered in the future because of a 
political decision to diminish the role of the state in the socioeconomic sphere and reduce 
the level and reach of social payments. The second relates to the risk that the cost of the 
unfunded social pension and its supplement may become unduly onerous because of the 
rise in the system dependency ratio from the combined effect of declining fertility and 
increasing longevity. In the period until 2025 it is expected that the number of people 
older than 64 years will increase by more than 40 percent while the number of people in 
the working age between 18 and 64 years will decrease by five percent. Thus, even 
without any change in political orientation, a reduction in the level of benefits may 
become necessary.   
 
In well-governed countries, like Denmark, the risk of abrupt changes to pension benefits 
for people, who are already retired or are close to retirement, is small. Adjustments may 
be made in the level of benefits of future generations to cope with the impact of growing 
longevity, although such changes may not represent a reduction in total retirement 
benefits but rather an attempt to contain an inexorable increase in the total cost of such 
benefits because of the demographic changes. Nevertheless, a decline in promised 
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benefits represents a risk for future pensioners even if it is a response to increasing 
longevity. 
 
In the funded pillars, the main risks facing active workers and pensioners are financial 
and insurance risks. In a typical funded plan, workers face three types of risk. The first 
risk is the investment risk during the accumulation phase of the plan, i.e. the risk that 
returns will be low and workers will fail to accumulate sufficient capital for the 
generation of adequate income in retirement. The second risk is the annuitization risk, the 
risk that at the time of retirement long-term interest rates will be very low and will 
produce a low annuitized income - most directly recognized when the accumulated 
capital is converted into an annuity. The third risk is the inflation risk faced during the 
retirement life of a member and this occurs when the regular pension income is fixed in 
nominal terms and is not adjusted for inflation. 
 
The main insurance risks are the risk of early death and the need to provide for the 
surviving dependents of insured workers, the risk of disability, and the risk of longevity, 
which implies the need to ensure that workers do not outlive their accumulated savings. 
 
Naturally, the trend towards pension savings taking the form of phased withdrawals 
instead of annuities poses a risk to the pensioner in times of increasing longevity. The 
heavier reliance on phased withdrawals gives more freedom of choice to the individual to 
decide upon the pattern of consumption over time, but also introduces the risk of very 
low income in the late stages of life. 
 
In Denmark, the risk-sharing arrangements of pillar II and III schemes have the result of 
aligning the interests of active workers and pensioners. The investment, annuitization and 
inflation risks are all mitigated by using contracts that specify minimum guaranteed rates 
of return for both the active and passive phases of contracts and by setting annuity 
conversion factors many years ahead of the time of annuitization. Insurance risks are also 
mitigated by pooling death, disability and longevity risks.  
 
A central feature of the Danish approach is the low level of guaranteed benefits for new 
contracts. The level of actual benefits is adjusted by the declaration of regular bonuses. 
These reflect both the financial and the underwriting performance of underlying schemes. 
Effectively pension institutions use a combination of nominal and variable annuities with 
the benefits on the latter reflecting both investment performance and longevity 
experience. 
 
A major risk for both active workers and pensioners is that pension institutions will not 
be able to deliver the guaranteed benefits. Effective regulation and supervision, 
emphasizing a risk-based approach to capital and asset/liability management, aims to 
ensure that pension institutions are not only able to meet their contractual obligations but 
achieve a level of performance that provides adequate total benefits to members and 
policyholders. However, the risk of low returns and benefits, because investment 
guarantees necessitate strategies favoring safe but low-yielding assets, has stimulated a 
growing demand for products without guarantees or with a lower level of guarantees, but 
   - 57 -
a greater potential for higher returns. The growing use of phased withdrawals, which do 
not cover the longevity risk, may reflect a demand for greater financial flexibility by 
Danish workers and for a lower level of longevity insurance than is provided on a 
combined basis by the social pension system and the guaranteed products of the annuity 
elements of the funded pillars. 
 
Another risk concerning the traditional guaranteed products is the risk of a systematically 
biased or distorted distribution among different generations of insured workers. 
Application of the so-called contribution principle, discussed in the preceding chapter, 
aims to alleviate this risk.   
 
Members of funded pension schemes face some political risk from future changes in the 
taxation of retirement saving and investment income and from a compulsory direction of 
pension fund investments into low-yielding assets. The latter would represent an indirect 
method of taxation, but would be out line both with past experience and with Danish as 
well as European legislation.  
 
C.   Risks Faced by Pension Institutions 
 
In the Danish pension market the private providers of pension products include 
commercial insurance companies, insurance companies established and owned by labor 
market organizations, multi-employer pension funds operating under the legislative and 
regulatory regime as life insurance companies, and - playing a marginal role - corporate 
pension funds. 
 
The main risk for all suppliers is a normal commercial risk related to any provision of 
private services. In this respect the pension market does not differ from any other market. 
In the present situation there is a very high certainty of a stable and even increasing 
demand, but competition might lead customers to choose another supplier. This is mainly 
a risk faced by suppliers of individual pension insurance, but suppliers of occupational 
pension schemes face a similar risk that a scheme may collectively decide to transfer its 
business to another supplier. Examples have been seen in the market. 
 
In addition to this ordinary commercial risk, pension institutions also face the political 
risk that their operating environment may change drastically over the long life of the 
guaranteed contracts they offer, without having the ability to adjust the type and level of 
guarantees toward their customers.  An example of this risk could be changes in the 
taxation of investment income making the offer of pension guarantees more risky for 
suppliers. Another example could be drastic changes in prudential regulations, involving 
an increase in capital requirements and/or a significant rise in operating costs.  
  
Other risks for pension institutions concern the pension guarantees and with profit 
products. The guarantees are based on the total of technical insurance elements: interest 
rate, insurance risks and costs. The risks concerning these elements are correlated in the 
way that a surplus in one element reduces the risk in the other elements and a deficit 
increases the risk in the other elements. The fact that the guarantees concern the benefits 
   - 58 -
in total and not the single technical element should be remembered when reading the 
following observations regarding financial market and insurance risks. 
 
The main financial market risk is the risk of declining interest rates. As long as the 
market interest rate remains in safe distance above the minimum guaranteed rate, the risk 
of falling markets rates only affects the declaration of bonuses and is thus borne by 
customers. However, when market rates come very close or fall below the guaranteed 
levels, pension institutions face a serious risk of capital erosion and even insolvency. 
Most suppliers have chosen during the last five years or so to cover their market risk 
through an extensive use of derivatives, especially long swaps in the more developed and 
more liquid euro market. 
 
A mismatch of the duration of assets and liabilities forms a special challenge for the 
companies. As a general rule, the duration of liabilities is much longer than the duration 
of derivatives available on the market.  It is worth noticing that the asset liability 
management is totally based on market conditions. The Danish government does not in 
any way try to supply the market with long-term instruments dedicated to close the 
duration gap between assets and liabilities. 
 
There is a market risk from falling interest rates as well as from rising interest rates. This 
is due to the fair value accounting rules, according to which the assets are valued at 
market prices and the liabilities are valued at estimated market prices. The capital loss of 
assets caused by an increase in the interest rate is not offset by a capital gain of liabilities, 
since according to the accounting rules the decrease of the reserves for guaranteed 
pensions is balanced by an increase in the required reserves for future bonuses. However 
the change in the composition of liabilities with heavier reliance on bonus potentials 
when interest rates increase creates a loss absorbing buffer. Therefore, the risk of low or 
falling interest rates is more pervasive due to the guaranteed benefits built into most 
contracts.  
 
An additional complication arises from the extensive use of assets by Danish pension 
institutions that have embedded options, especially in the case of mortgage bonds. These 
allow borrowers to refinance their mortgage loans at a pre-set price when rates are falling 
and deprive pension institutions of high-yielding assets when the value of their long-term 
liabilities increases because of the fall in market interest rates. However, this is a basic 
financial market risk that requires pension institutions to adopt sophisticated asset 
liability management practices that are commensurate with the financial sophistication of 
the products they sell and the assets in which they invest.   
 
The insurance risks – such as longevity, disability and early death – are shared among 
insurance providers and the insured. As long as the realized result is better than the 
assumptions made for the technical reserves, changes will result in higher bonuses; thus 
the risks are on the side of the customers. But if the realized result turns out worse than 
assumed for the calculation of technical reserves, the risks are borne by providers.   
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D.   Risks Faced by Government 
 
The risks faced by the government concern the first pillar as well as the second and third 
pillars. The social pension can in principle be changed at any time by a majority of the 
parliament. There is no formal obligation for the government to maintain the real or 
nominal value of the pension benefits of the first pillar, not even for the current 
pensioners. However, the pension rights of citizens are politically a very sensitive area 
and thus in reality the social pension system is politically very difficult to adjust.   
 
The government has no formal, legal obligations for the private pension schemes of the 
second and third pillars. Hence the risks for the government regarding the pension system 
are not related to legally binding obligations. They are of a purely political and economic 
nature. 
 
The main political purpose of the pension system is to secure an acceptable standard of 
living for the old and disabled segment of the population. Goods and services to provide 
the acceptable standard of living for pensioners have to be supplied at any time by current 
production (together with accumulated net foreign assets). Although future levels of 
production may increase through an accumulation of domestic and foreign assets and 
through increases in productivity, current pensions must be financed from current 
production in a socially and politically acceptable way. The progressive aging of the 
population poses a serious challenge that is further aggravated by the growing demand 
for health and old-age care services.  
 
The first risk for the government is the risk of social poverty that would occur if some old 
people, who have not saved for a pension, would be left without any public support. The 
role of the first pillar of the pension system is to deal with this risk. The first pillar of the 
pension system provides every Danish citizen a social pension and a pension in the case 
of disability. The social pension is relatively low, but is adequate to support the basic 
needs of life. 
 
The second risk for the government is the risk of social unrest, if a large number of 
pensioners faces a major decline in living standards compared to the standards during 
their working life. The second and third pillars of the pension system provide Danish 
citizens with an opportunity to secure a pension that reflects the level of income during 
their working life. Participation in the second and third pillars is not compulsory by law. 
But the government provides incentives for pension saving, in the form of both tax 
incentives and legal restrictions that require the use of accumulated savings for pension 
purposes. 
 
A third risk for the government is a low saving rate. With too low savings, the external 
balance of the Danish economy could again become a problem, as it was during the last 
decades of the last century. Too low a saving rate would severely increase the economic 
problems caused by the aging of the population. The three pillar pension system copes 
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with this risk by promoting the growth of fully funded pension schemes. All pension 
schemes in the second and third pillar and part of the first pillar are fully funded.  
 
In principle this should not influence the total saving rate in a country with a highly 
developed and well functioning capital market, such as Denmark. With full access by 
households to increased borrowing, an increase in pension savings could be neutralized 
by a decrease in other private savings.  But the fact is that especially the growing 
participation of lower income groups in pension schemes since the beginning of the 
1980s has had a positive impact on the private saving rate.  
 
Tax rules have added to this impact. Pension premiums are in general exempt from 
income tax, while pension benefits are subject to tax. The deferral of income taxation is 
not only encouraging private saving; it is also moderating public expenditure by 
diminishing the present tax base.   
 
A fourth risk for the government is financial instability caused by lower fiscal income 
and increased public expenditure as the population grows older. The pension system 
contributes to avoiding this risk. The taxation of pension savings  - pension premiums 
being exempt from income taxation and pension benefits being taxable income - transfers 
the taxation from the time of income – the working period - to the time of consumption – 
the pension period. The development of the tax base is thereby brought in better 
alignment with the expected need for public expenditure.   
 
In a pension system based on private savings and insurance it is more difficult for future 
politicians to influence or to change the level of pension for future pensioners than in a 
pension system based on pay-as-you-go financing. This quality of a funded, insurance 
pension system has a number of advantages. For the working population of today – the 
future pensioners – it transfers the political risk of a pay-as-you-go system that is that the 
future working population will not be willing to pay the taxes needed to finance the 
future pensions, into a market risk, that is the risks of low interest rates, bankruptcy of the 
pension providers, etc.  
 
In the present situation with a growing number of pensioners the increase of the part of 
total income and consumption opportunities that needs to be distributed to pensioners is 
more likely to be accepted via the market – that is via ownership of capital – than via 
political decisions. The theoretical risk of too high future pensions can still be avoided 
through taxation, for instance through taxation of the investment income of the pension 
schemes and through taxation of pension benefits. 
  
In addition to these political risks the funded and insurance based pension system creates 
another risk for the government: the risk of bankruptcy of the pension providers. To 
minimize this risk the Danish insurance companies and pension funds are subject to very 
tight public regulation and supervision. If a pension provider were to become insolvent, 
the Danish government has no formal or legal obligation to secure the pensions of the 
customers of the provider. Nevertheless, even though there has been no practical 
experience of insolvencies in Denmark for the last eighty years, it is generally agreed that 
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should an incident like this occur some time in the future, the government would have to 
consider an intervention. If the consequences for the customers and probably especially 
for the actual pensioners are considered politically unacceptable it is presumed that the 
political system will have to solve the problem.  
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V.   CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES 
 
In many ways and at various levels the Danish pension system is robust and well 
designed. The system has some strengths and advantages which could serve to inspire 
other countries that for some reason are in the process of reviewing their pension system. 
 
First and foremost the Danish pension system provides a basic cover for pension needs to 
practically speaking the entire population. This is done through the tax financed pay-as-
you-go schemes in pillar I and supplemented by the ATP, which - although not being a 
part of the public welfare system - shares characteristics with public, social schemes. The 
broad coverage ensures that pensioners do not end up in poverty, even if they have 
insufficient private savings.  
 
The basic state pension is at a relatively low level considering the Danish income level in 
general, but on the other hand the state pension is given at a flat rate irrespective of 
previous earnings. Rights to the basic pension are earned through citizenship and 
residency and not through any previous relation to the labor market.  For people who 
have been on low incomes before retirement, the state pension together with ATP does 
act as a reasonable safety net.   
 
Second, the Danish pension system has a multitude of pension institutions providing 
pillar II schemes. These represent funded pension schemes which have been negotiated as 
part of labor market agreements. Over the past 20 years or so these schemes have been 
widened to almost 80 percent or more of wage earners, who contribute 10 percent - and 
often much more - of their salary for pension purposes. The schemes are fully funded and 
the obligations to provide future pension incomes are isolated from the companies where 
the employees earn their salary. Risk sharing, therefore, does not involve the companies 
of the employees. This is a very important advantage compared to the pension systems of 
many other countries. 
 
Due to the fully funded and defined contribution nature of pillar II schemes the system 
provides a high degree of mobility of pension rights. Thus pillar II schemes do not cause 
any distortions to labor market mobility. 
 
Within the schemes the members are to a large extent sharing risks based on solidarity, 
e.g., the unisex principle is mandatory and health conditions etc. are taken into account 
only to a minor degree upon entering the schemes in pillar II.  
 
Third, in pillar III each individual has the possibility to align his or her intentions for the 
future life as a pensioner with the present income stream and to purchase additional cover 
in the case of early death or disability.  
 
By relying on these three pillars the Danish pension system combines the strengths of 
each pillar, while limiting their weaknesses - for example the tax financing in pillar I 
schemes does lead to some economic inefficiency (through the creation of tax wedges). 
However, this problem would be much more severe if the pension system was totally 
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based upon pillar I. There seems to be great support for the additional pension provision 
in pillar II and III, and over the years a large proportion of pay rises has been used to 
increase pension contributions in pillar II. 
 
The funded nature of pillars II and III also strengthens the trust in and support of the 
system. Clearly there is a risk that future pension income could be taxed more heavily 
than foreseen when contributions were made - however, the real values of any promise of 
future pension income is dependent upon the size of future real national income 
(production). The Danish case provides some evidence that funded pension schemes are 
able to gather support among the working population and pensioners and probably more 
so than a system relying more heavily on future tax payers to provide future pension 
income. 
 
Over the coming 20 to 40 years many Western European countries will experience quite 
dramatic demographic changes, where the proportion of pensioners will increase sharply 
in relation to the number of people in working age. This is bound to put upward pressure 
on public expenditures and taxes, in many cases to a degree which is deemed 
unsustainable.  
 
This demographic challenge to the economy will also make itself felt in Denmark. 
However, the organization of the pension system with a broadly-based and fully-funded 
private pension system, supplementing the public system, makes the Danish economy 
less exposed to the challenge. Or, in other words, the strain on the public finances would 
have been much more severe without the private pension system.  
 
The Danish government set up a Welfare Commission which was assigned the task of 
analyzing the challenges posed by the demographic changes to come. A report from the 
Commission with proposals for welfare reform was presented in early December 2005. In 
the report the Welfare Commission expressed support for the three-pillar pension system 
highlighting the balancing of risks and merits of the different pillars. As part of a 
comprehensive reform proposal the Commission suggested to consider the introduction 
of some obligatory pension savings for people falling outside the scope of the present 
pillar II and III. It also suggested to consider expanding the incentives to rely more on 
annuities as the preferred payout method.  
 
In April 2006, the Danish government presented its proposal for welfare reforms to cope 
with the demographic changes over the next decades. The proposals clearly have as their 
starting point the recommendations of the Danish Welfare Commission, although the 
proposals of this Commission were more all-encompassing into all aspects of the welfare 
system than the government proposals. 
 
The aim of the government proposals is to make the Danish economy and the Danish 
welfare system more robust against the longer term challenges. A key objective is to raise 
the average age of retirement. Key proposals in this area are to raise the rate of possible 
early retirement from 60 to 63 years and to raise the official retirement age from 65 to 67 
years. These reforms are only intended to affect people presently under the age of 50, 
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hence the changes will be phased in gradually. The basic pension system - based on the 3 
pillars and with the private system supplementing the public one - will remain a 
cornerstone of the welfare system and as a means of protecting the incomes of future 
pensioners. If carried through, the reforms could strengthen the incentives to save for 
pensions under pillars II and III. 
 
Political discussions on the reform proposals are to be finalized before the summer 2006. 
There seems to be rather broad political consensus on the overall reform objectives.  
 
Contributions to pensions in pillar II and III are income tax deductible but benefits are 
taxed when paid out. Through pension contributions, individual tax payments become 
more directly related to lifetime income and consumption possibilities than to income in 
the active working years.  
 
Since Denmark applies a system of progressive taxation, this implies that the total tax 
burden is reduced through pension contributions - on the important assumption that tax 
rates are kept unchanged over time. This has certainly not been the case when a longer 
time span is considered. However, there is some merit to the tax burden reflecting 
lifetime consumption possibilities - instead of present income - no matter what happens 
to the average tax burden.   
 
In contrast to many other countries the current investment yield obtained in life insurance 
companies and pension funds is taxed in Denmark. The rate of tax is 15 percent no matter 
whether the yield represents interest yield, stock return or other investment income.  
 
The application of taxation to the current yield reflects that Denmark is a high tax 
country. Investment income from sources other than pensions is taxed with no less than 
33 percent and up to almost 60 percent. Moreover, negative interest income (interest on 
loans) is tax deductible at a rate of 33 percent. Hence, if investment income in pension 
institutions were not taxed there would be room for tax arbitrage (or limits would have to 
be imposed on contributions to pension schemes). The present system does not invoke tax 
arbitrage to a large extent and still provides a reasonable tax incentive to save for 
pensions. 
 
When looking closer into the features of the private pension system in pillar II and III the 
growth rate and dominance of pillar II is remarkable. Moreover, the preference by the 
Danes for the risk sharing and solidarity features of life insurance companies and pension 
funds - as opposed to more simple savings vehicles in banks - deserves attention.   
 
In Denmark, the demand for pension benefits has for several years been concentrated on 
contracts with some kind of built-in guarantee for the future benefits. Pension institutions 
have issued contracts with guarantees, which imply that over time a certain investment 
yield must be obtained. In order for this system to work, reserves are built up in years of 
high investment yields, and these reserves are used in years with lower or negative yields 
to smoothen out the increase in the benefits of the policyholders. Over time, each 
policyholder will obtain a market yield, but the smoothing of yields between 
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policyholders and over time has been seen as an integral part of the risk sharing 
mechanism.  
 
This system has come under strain in recent years because of falling interest rates and 
turbulence on the stock markets, not least after the September 11 events in 2001. When 
life insurance companies and pension funds have guaranteed future benefits, they are not 
able to optimize the long-term relationship between expected returns and benefits. The 
cost of the guarantees attached to traditional pension products in terms of lower average 
yields, therefore, has been widely recognized in recent years. 
 
Hence, new products with no or very limited guarantees have gained market share. The 
products include unit link insurance, but product development is taking place at a rapid 
pace. New products, which fall between unit-link insurance and more traditional products 
(in the Danish market), seem to be entering the market with great success.  
 
The growth of products with no or limited guarantees - based on the yield obtained being 
attributed to policyholders in each year - also satisfies wishes expressed by politicians. 
They want the pension market to become more transparent for the individual. Whether 
this is also a consumer need - not least considering the long-term nature of pensions and 
the importance of providing pensions for future generations instead of merely achieving 
short-term individual influence on asset allocation - remains to be seen.  
 
The increasing market share of new products also reflects a market trend toward more 
freedom of choice for the individual. This trend has been seen for many years regarding 
individual choice of benefits of insurance coverage. Thus the widow’s pension used to be 
a mandatory part of an ordinary occupational pension scheme. But today the widow’s 
pension can be chosen individually by members of many occupational schemes. In recent 
years this demand for more freedom of choice has widened to include individual 
influence on the investment policy. Therefore the increased market share of new products 
can also be seen as a demand for individual freedom of choice. 
 
There is a move toward more flexibility in the menu of retirement products.  This 
represents a move toward more variable annuities (like in unit-linked products) and more 
combinations.  The political authorities and legislators have promoted these trends and 
the resulting decline in the share of guaranteed products.  This has been possible not least 
because the Danish pension system contains first pillar benefits that provide protection 
against longevity and market risk.   
 
Like in every other country the activities of life insurance companies and pension funds 
are tightly regulated. The Danish supervisory system and regulation has elements which 
must be considered as quite forward looking. The accounting regulation is based upon 
market valuation of both assets and liabilities. In such a market-value-based environment 
there is no distinction between unrealized and realized gains and losses - they all go 
through the profit and loss account, they are being taxed, they are distributed to 
policyholders and shareholders, and they account equally for solvency purposes. 
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Especially the application of market accounting rules on the liability side is a major 
Danish achievement and should serve to inspire many other countries. 
 
The accounting environment serves to strengthen and buttress the risk-sharing features of 
life insurance and pension business in Denmark. All gains and losses are recognized and 
shared between policyholders and shareholders - and among policyholders - according to 
the contribution principle. The accounting framework prevents gains and losses from 
being hidden and reveals the underlying risk profile of the different contracts. 
 
Risk sharing is, therefore, quite transparent in the Danish system. It is not possible in the 
Danish system to hide liabilities and losses through artificial accounting measures or to 
turn over the risks to third parties. The impact of positive and negative market events is 
shared between policyholders and shareholders, thus not imposing strain on other actors 
in the economy.  
 
The well-developed risk-sharing mechanisms and reliance on funded schemes in pillars II 
and III also imply that issues which are very important in many other countries are less 
important in Denmark. The funded system, coupled with the use of market values and 
market-based information requires, for instance, that changes in longevity (and other 
factors) must be taken into account and considered. When longevity increases, the 
actuaries must assure that liabilities are adjusted properly, and the technical assumptions 
governing the pension products must be reconsidered. Hence, the system provides 
incentives and requirements to react when important underlying factors change. 
 
This is not necessarily the case in unfunded pillar I schemes which are subject to political 
decision making. Changes in longevity will only over a longer time span require political 
intervention. Therefore, the pressure on politicians today to secure the long term 
sustainability of the public pillar I pension scheme is limited. The risk is, therefore, that 
the need for such changes may be hidden for years. This is less likely in pillar II and III 
schemes. While the public pension system does not run an insolvency risk like schemes 
in pillar II and III there is a risk of intergenerational conflict inherent in the public 
pension system.  
 
The regulatory framework governing the private pension system has over the years been 
gradually changed. Today, the supervisory focus is on gathering market-based evidence 
and strengthening incentives to control and monitor risks. Also, market discipline is being 
enhanced through the release of market-based information. Market forces and market 
discipline, emphasizing the responsibility of management, is seen as more effective than 
regulation through laws, limits and requirements. Although regulation is in many ways 
quite intense - also seen from a cost perspective - the basic premise to rely on incentives, 
risk control, and management responsibility must be seen as a major advantage of the 
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